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THE COURT AND ITS CRITICS
THE HONORABLE Tom C. CLARKf
EVER SINCE it was organized in 1790 there has been an "open
season" on criticism of the United States Supreme Court. Perhaps
there are more hunters today and more game with fewer applicable
game laws. Moreover, ours is an age of dissidence and it is engulfing
our whole civilization from Lagos to Auckland. The battle cry is the
failure to fulfill man's dreams and the downgrading of his accomplish-
ments. Law, the only dependable force for man's freedoms, is mis-
trusted and pilloried on all sides. Its world exemplar - the Supreme
Court - is suffering its darkest hour at a time when it deserves
admiration for its most glorious day. What is the shouting all about?
Much of the cause of the criticism has centered around the Court's
responsibility in three areas: Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the implied power of the Court to pass on the constitutional validity of
the actions of the Executive and Congress, and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Most of the dissatisfaction with the Court is based on section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which as originally written authorized
the Supreme Court to re-examine decisions of state courts where
federal constitutional issues were involved. As presently amended, this
power has been extended to all federal courts. James Jackson, a
Georgia Representative to the Congress, characterized section 25 in
present-day language:
It swallows up every shadow of a State Judiciary. . . . In my
opinion, and I am convinced experience will prove it, there will
not, neither can there be, any suit or action brought in any State
Courts but may under this clause be reversed or affirmed by being
brought within the cognizance of the Supreme Court.'
But the Congress sided with Roger Sherman who found section 25
was necessary "to guard the rights of the Union against the invasion
of the States."'
t Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Retired).
1. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITI D STATES HISTORY 11 (Revised
ed. 1937).
2. Id.
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As early as Cohens v. Virginia,8 demands were being made for the
repeal of section 25. The uproar was so loud in the ears of the Court
that Chief Justice Marshall answered them in Fisher v. Cockerell
in this fashion:
In the argument we have been admonished of the jealousy
with which the states of the Union view the revising power in-
trusted by the constitution and laws of the United States to this
tribunal. To observations of this character, the answer uniformly
given has been that the course of the judicial department is marked
out by law. We must tread the direct and narrow path prescribed
for us. As this court has never grasped at ungranted jurisdiction,
so will it never, we trust, shrink from the exercise of that which
is conferred upon it.5
In addition to section 25, another cause of dissatisfaction is the
power of the Court to pass on the constitutional validity of actions
of the Executive Department and the Congress. There is no specific
grant of power in the Constitution as to this but it was established
in Marbury v. Madison6 and subsequent cases. However, there is a
paucity of cases where federal action was overturned. Indeed, in the
first 80 years of the Court only four federal statutes were stricken.
By the close of the last term of the Court only 83 acts of Congress
had been invalidated. As Mr. Justice Holmes told the Harvard Law
School Association in 1913: "[T]he United States would not come to
an end if we [the Court] lost our power to declare an Act of Con-
gress void." 7
As to the laws of the States, however, the Justice had the opposite
view: "I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make
that declaration as to the laws of the several States."' John C. Calhoun
saw the problem differently: It makes "the government of the United
States the sole judge, in the last resort, as to the extent of its [the
state's] powers .... It is the great enforcing power to compel a State
to submit to all Acts [of the Federal Government]." Calhoun was
right as is proven in a parade of cases from Dartmouth Collegel" to
the Slaughter-House Cases." As late as 1969 the number of state
acts that had fallen had reached some 750.
3. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
4. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 248 (1831).
5. Id. at 259.
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. THz OCCASIONAL SPECHtS OV JuSTIC9 OLIVZR W4NDELL HOLMZS, "LAW
AND T1n CouRr" 172 (M. Howe ed. 1962).
8. Id.
9. 1 Tni WORKS Ol JOHN C. CALHOUN 338-39 (R. Cralle ed. 1851).
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
11. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
[VOL. 15 : p. 521
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Having these responsibilities, the Court has been obligated to
fulfill them. This has maintained a continuous strained relation be-
tween the States, the President, the Congress, and the Court. Indeed,
as early as 1792 the State of Georgia had prohibited service of federal
process against the State. The next year Chief Justice Rutledge failed
of confirmation, and ten years thereafter Justice Chase was impeached
but came clear by one vote in the Senate. In 1809, Pennsylvania
called out its militia to prevent the enforcement of a federal court
judgment. The second Cherokee case, Worcester v. Georgia,12 found
President Jackson and Chief Justice Marshall feuding over a Georgia
Indian law. When Marshall decided against the State, Jackson is
reputed to have said: "John Marshall has made his decision, now
let him enforce it." And it possibly would never have been enforced
had not South Carolina's legislature passed the Nullification Ordi-
nance. This aroused Jackson's ire and brought on the Force Bill
which put both Georgia and South Carolina to their knees. In this
century, both Roosevelts had their troubles with the Court, the latter
attempting to pack it and the former barring Mr. Justice Holmes from
social functions at the White House!
A third cause for conflict arises from the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution. In addition to the equal protection clause of the
amendment upon which the segregation and apportionment cases are
based, the due process clause has been held to incorporate most of
the provisions of the first eight amendments against state action. Many
criminal cases have been overturned in late years on these provisions
and libel, slander, and free press litigation has come under federal
supervision.
During the decade and a half since Brown v. Board of Education8
and the segregation cases which followed, the anguish has reached
impeachment proportions. The demands arose from four principal
areas wherein the Court had acted, namely, segregation, criminal law,
legislative apportionment, and school prayer.14
It now appears that the philosophy of Brown has won acceptance
on its face. True, there is still considerable "dragging of feet" in both
12. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Judge James 0. Monroe, Jr., would add state-federal relations and civil
liberties to the list of complaints. There can be no doubt that state-federal relations
have been strained to the limit by the rash of state prisoner applications filed in
federal courts. However, the civil liberties era of Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S.
576 (1958); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691 (1958); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) ; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) ; Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957) ; Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956) ; Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956), is over, in my view.
SPRING 1970]
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official and unofficial life but progress is being made even though it
be with less than "deliberate speed." School districts are being inte-
grated and both parents and children are becoming more adaptable to
the process. This fact is the most promising sign on the horizon.
Morality, human understanding, and compassion cannot be obtained
by edict. It can only develop through contact and education. In
transportation and other places of public accommodation' 5 little evi-
dence of segregation remains. Now and then a southern Governor
lets forth a catcall but even those are now being beamed to the short-
comings of the North.
On the other hand, the "crime wave" has placed the advance-
ments made by the Supreme Court in the field of criminal justice in
jeopardy. Beginning in 1956 with Griffin v. Illinois,"0 which required
a record of the trial to be furnished indigent defendants, the Court
took broad and effective strides in the improvement of criminal pro-
cedures. Mapp v. Ohio"7 extended the exclusionary rule to the States;
Gideon v. Wainwright' required counsel to be furnished indigent
defendants facing felony prosecution; Miranda v. Arizona"0 laid down
warnings that must be given suspects before interrogation and Berger
v. New York20 restricted eavesdropping to the limits of probable cause.
Each of these cases has suffered continual criticism ever since they
were announced. In substance the charge is that the restrictions
"hamstring" the police, encourage unlawful activity, and tip the scales
of justice toward the criminal. I do not subscribe to these conclusions.
Rather than "hamstringing" crime detection, I believe that they will
improve it. Before this line of cases came down, the police would con-
centrate on securing a confession from a suspect, and after securing
one would make no further investigation. In the event the confession
was not admitted in evidence at the trial, the prosecution would fail.
Now, however, the police have learned that a confession is "suspect."
Even after securing one they continue to investigate, run down leads,
etc. Should the confession be denied admission into evidence, the
valid evidence is often sufficient to convict. Indeed, in most cases a
confession is not needed to secure a conviction. The evidence is usually
overwhelming without it. Moreover, the adoption of these enlightened
rules is within our concepts of the presumption of innocence, fair
trial, and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Winston
Churchill's yardstick a civilized society is measured by its concepts
15. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
16. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
[VOL. 15 : p. 521
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of criminal justice; ours is the most enlightened in history. Nor do I
find that these protections have reduced the percentage of convictions.
Indeed, they are at an all-time high in the federal system which
has been operating under all of the critical procedures for some six
years. Finally, to say that criminality is encouraged is pure nonsense.
Criminals do not study Supreme Court decisions before engaging in
criminal activity. They are either desperate and are willing to take
their chances on "getting caught" or they believe theirs will be the
perfect crime and go unsolved. Indeed, statisticians claim that only
20 percent of the offenses committed are uncovered and the offenders
arrested. It is this 80 percent that the criminal relies upon, not on
decisions of the courts. In fact, over 95 percent of those apprehended
in the federal system either plead or are found guilty and are punished.
It is unfortunate that some prosecutors advocate radical changes
in our present procedures. Some favor "preventive detention" as a
deterrent to crime. This would be a heavy penalty to pay. Would it
not be better to advance the date of trial as we are doing in the federal
system. The development of modern procedural techniques such as
individual calendaring, the use of omnibus discovery practices, etc.,
would be just as effective. Likewise, the relaxation of the normal
protections against wiretapping and eavesdropping is a mistake. We
should insist that there be probable cause supporting the use of such
devices before they are permitted.
Legislative apportionment was the cause of no little dissatisfaction
with the Court. It directly affected the political establishment and the
fortunes of many state legislators and some Congressmen, as well.
There is little wonder that Senator Dirksen's effort to force a consti-
tutional convention on the question almost bore fruit. However, since
Baker v. Carr2 the public has become informed on the question and
it appears that the effort to amend the Constitution has died on the
vine. It is true that the Court did a complete about-face on this issue.
The doctrine of Colegrove v. Green22 that the question was a political
one upon which the courts would not inquire has been overturned by
the cry of "one man-one vote." Since that time every State in the
Union has been reapportioned and the process is being extended to
county and precinct government. 3 While I did not join in some of
the opinions because in my view the federal analogy applied to dual
form legislative bodies, there can be no question but that Baker was
long overdue. Whether it should have been extended to local govern-
ment is another question on which I disagree. But even here it will
21. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
22. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
23. Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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do no harm and, indeed, may bring on reform that is badly needed
in this area.
The cases affecting the conduct of religious exercises in the public
schools is the final controversy that still confronts the Court. When
Mr. Justice Black in Engel v. Vitale 4 struck down New York's prayer
in its public schools, there was much gnashing of teeth. Indeed, the
press so distorted the opinion that I departed from my policy of no
public comment on decided cases to deal with the matter before the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. Thereafter Abington School
District v. Schempp" attempted a clarification of the issue. However,
the question remains a most divisive and controversial one. In many
parts of the country I find people who are insisting on a change in the
first amendment. While I doubt that this will ever occur - and pray
that it will not - we should devote our attention to the problem.
My solution has been to encourage the teaching of comparative religion
and like subjects in the public schools. The State of Florida has taken
a decided step in this direction and California is following suit.
The mortification that some have with the Supreme Court will,
of course, continue. It will ebb and flow with the character of its
decisions. The history of the United States has been written to a
large extent in the Chambers of the Supreme Court. As Attorney
General Wickersham so well said in his eulogy on Chief Justice Fuller:
"In the largest proportion of causes submitted to its judgment every
decision becomes a page of history. . ". ." This could not otherwise
be when we note that the Constitution itself made its own provisions
the supreme law of the land and created the Supreme Court as the
final interpreter of them. Daniel Webster, in commenting on these
two provisions of the Constitution, characterized the Court as the
cutting edge of the National sword. And in another of his eulogistic
trilogies reminiscent of his "Liberty and Union, now and forever,
one and inseparable," Webster spoke of the Court as "one tribunal
established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all. .... 2,
If we are to have a United States of America we had best continue this
safeguard to our liberties as the keystone of our governmental arch.
24. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
25. 374 U.S. 203 (1962).
26. Proceedings on the Death of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, 219 U.S. viii, xv (1911)
27. Dunne, Joseph Story: The Age of Jackson, 34 Mo. L. R.v. 307, 316 (1969).
[VOL. 15 : p. 521
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PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE INEQUITABLE
LOSS OF PENSION BENEFITS
NOEL ARNOLD LEVINt
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no guarantee that pensions will be paid as promised. The
ability to fulfill the eligibility requirements is highly contingent
on a host of situations largely beyond the individual's control.
In all too many cases the pension promise shrinks to this: "if
you remain in good health and stay with the same company until
you are 65 years old, and if the company is still in business, and if
your department has not been abolished, and if you haven't been
laid off for too long a period, and if there's enough money in the
fund, and that money has been prudently managed, you will
get a pension."'
IN OUR AMERICAN SOCIETY, and indeed in almost all civili-
zations of the world, people are motivated to a great extent by
the expectation of a reward based on a certain effort. When individ-
uals are deprived of their expected gains, personal problems may
develop. However, when large groups of people lose advantages which
they were entitled to expect, problems arise for the social order as a
whole. The problem is compounded further when people have worked
long and hard for what they do not get and when their penalty occurs
through no fault of their own.
Former United States Assistant Secretary of Labor Donahue
observed that "[i]t is utterly indefensible in a society as affluent as
ours that an individual's economic security in his later years should
rest on . . . a flimsy foundation and be so endangered by such an
incredible list of 'ifs' and 'maybes'." 2
It is the purpose of this Article to consider the ways employees
may lose pension benefits to which they should be entitled, to analyze
the prevailing case law, and to discuss currently pending legislation.
In this commentary of primary concern are situations where groups
t Member of the New York and Connecticut Bars. B.A., Williams College,1952; LL.B., Yale University, 1955. The author would like to acknowledge with
appreciation the research assistance of Mr. Robert I. Gosseen, LL.B., and candidate
for the LL.M. in Labor Law.
1. Excerpt of testimony by Thomas R. Donahue, former Asst. Secy. of Labor,
before Labor Subcommittee, Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., July 25,
1968, quoted in D. Jonson, Recovery for Non-vested Employees; How to Hunt Ducks
with a Broom, in 10 TEXTBOOK FOR WELFARS, PENSION TRuSTgts AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 TZXTBOOK].
2. Id.
(527)
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of employees lose benefits - as distinguished from the individual's
loss of benefits. The problems, although interrelated, are different.
Ultimately suggestions will be proposed to substantially eliminate or
alleviate these problems by recommending certain substantive and
procedural changes.
II. PRIVATE PENSION PLANS
A recent government survey concluded that: "As a matter of
equity and fair treatment, an employee covered by a pension plan is
entitled, after a reasonable period of service, to protection of his future
retirement benefit against any termination of his employment."'
The private pension system grew up in the United States as a
supplement to, not a substitute for, the Social Security system. It
developed because the Social Security stipend was not enough to pro-
vide economic security and social dignity for retired persons. "In the
early days of retirement programs, it was common for the employer
merely to have a 'practice' of paying benefits to superannuated em-
ployees or to have an unfunded 'plan' which was expressly terminable
at the will of the employer, and the benefits of which were entirely
within the discretion of the employer."4 Retirement plans were in-
titated either through collective bargaining or by unilateral company
action. The ceilings imposed on direct wages by the United States
government during World War II provided an impetus for the growth
of pre-existing plans and for the establishment of new plans. Such
"fringe" benefits helped to attract and retain a scarce labor supply,
and were, in part, a substitute for the "freeze" in pay.' After direct
wage controls were abolished, interest in private pension plans re-
mained high. The development of these funds was aided by the decision
in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,6 in which pension rights were clearly
designated7 as "conditions of employment," and hence, a mandatory
bargaining subject under section 8(d) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947.8
3. PREs. COMM. ON CORP. PENSION FUNDS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVAT
PENSION PROGRAMS, A RfPORT TO TH PR4SIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE R5ATIR4MENT
PLANS 39 (1965).
4. Bernstein, Employee Benefit Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 HARV. L.
Rzv. 952, 959 (1963).
5. See P. Thomson, Mergers, Dissolutions and Transfers, in 9 TExTBOOK FOR
WLPARE, PENSION TRUSTEES AND ADMINISTRATORs 440 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
1967 TXXTBOOK]; see also M. B4RNSTIN, THi FUTURE 0F PRIVATE PENSIONs 4 (1964).
6. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
7. Id. at 251.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
[VOL. 15 : p. 527
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By the end of 1966, over 38.6 million workers (or retirees) were
covered by some type of retirement plan outside of Social Security.
Approximately 27.9 million participated in private funds,10 while
some 10.7 million were enrolled in plans for government employees."
Employee coverage under negotiated plans grew from 5 million workers
in 1950 to 11 million in 1960, to an estimated 15.5 million at last
estimate. 2 The dollar value of the reserves in private funds has risen
to over $115 billion, a recent Securities and Exchange Commission
report has revealed.'
The workers covered by most plans do not contribute and pay-
ments generally are made exclusively by the employers.' 4 The major
benefit derived by the employee is the assurance of an income upon
retirement." Additionally, many plans provide for severance pay-
ments, 6 death benefits,'" early retirement and disability, 8  It is im-
portant to note that employers also benefit. When workers retire
with guaranteed income based on a plan, the employer need not provide
remittances on an ad hoc basis or be forced to see faithful employees
leave with insufficient resources on which to live. Employees may be
attracted and retained because their pensions grow with years of service
and they lose materially if they change jobs.'9 The advantages of
pension plans have been summed up as providing "security for retirees
and incentives for those presently employed.""
Pension plans may be structured and administered in the follow-
ing ways:
1. An individual company.
2. A group of companies.21
9. P-H PENSION & PROFIT SHARING f 15,042 (1967).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 15,010.
13. SEC Statistical Bull. No. 2359, at 32 (May 1, 1969).
14. Plans that have employee contributions may receive Internal Revenue Service
qualification. Some plans merely allow employee contributions, while others, usually
non-negotiated, may require them.
15. RESEARCH INSTITUTE oF AMERICA, A BUSINESSMAN'S GUIDE TO PENSION
PLANS 3-4 (File 51, 1968).
16. See Davis, Negotiated Retirement Plans - A Decade of Benefit Improve-
ments, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1969, at 11.
17. See, e.g., Dickenson, Survivor Income: An Important New Benefit for
Employees, PENSION & WELFARE NEws, Jan. 1968, at 17; see also U.S. BUREAU Of
LABOR STATISTICS, DEF'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1334, PENSION PLANS UNDER COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING: BENEFITS FOR SURVIVORS, Winter 1961-62.
18. See, e.g., J. GABEL, Disability Benefits as Collateral Benefits Under Pension
Plans, 1967 TEXTBOOK, supra note 5, at 229.
19. A BUSINESSMAN'S GUIDE TO PENSION PLANS, supra note 15, at 24.
20. Id.
21. As of mid-1968 there were 1300 negotiated multi-employer funds covering 5
million workers. Kolodrubetz, Reciprocity and Pension Portability, MONTHLY LAB.
REv., Sept. 1968, at 23; see 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1964).
SPRING 1970]
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3. A single company and union jointly.22
4. Several companies (industry-wide) and a union jointly."
5. A union alone.14
6. A third-party trustee. 5
7. A governmental unit (for its employees).
Collectively bargained plans may be designed either in terms of benefits
or contributions, may be self-insured or use insurance companies, and
may or may not be funded.2"
It is true that few things cannot be improved. But it is important
not to jettison the entire private pension plan structure until viable
alternatives of equal merit exist. Efforts are now being made to im-
prove the situation without the destruction of the system. At the
present time proposed legislation is pending which would attempt to
reform and strengthen the entire private pension system.27 Advocates
of reform believe this is necessary to insure fairness and equity for
participants. Senator Jacob K. Javits has recently observed:
I believe that all of these problems are so interrelated that
they cannot be solved without a comprehensive legislative pro-
gram dealing not only with malfeasance of administrators, and
not only with the consequences of plant shut-downs and plant
terminations, but also with the broad spectrum of questions such
as adequacy of funding, reasonable minimum standards of vesting,
transferability of credits under some circumstances, and, in short,
the establishment of certain general minimum standards to which
all private pension plans must conform.2
Opponents, who have organized to combat some legislation, believe
much of it is unnecessary and an unwarranted interference with the
private sector.2" Moreover, in their opinion, such laws would inevit-
ably either lead to eventual government take-over of the private
22. See Levin, Negotiated Industry-Wide Plans Today, RrIRZMaNT PLAN
PERSPECTVES (Mfr. Hanover Trust of New York, Jan.-Feb. 1969).
23. Id.
24. Employers may legally contribute to union-administered trust funds only if
such funds were established by collective agreement prior to January 1, 1946. See 29
U.S.C. § 186(g) (1964).
25. E.g., The New York City taxi industry. See Levin, The Future of Employee
Benefit Trusts, PENSION & WELFARE News, Jan. 1970, at 21-22.
26. A BUSINASSMAN's GUIDn To PENSION PLANS, supra note 15, at 5.
27. Some of these reform bills include: The Pension Benefit Security Act, S.
3421, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); The Pension Benefit Security Act, H.R. 1045,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; The Welfare and Pension Plan Protection Act of 1969,
H.R. 1046, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; The Pension and Employee Benefit Act of
1969, S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); The Disclosure and Fiduciary Respon-
sibility Act, H.R. 6204, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; and the "Administration" pro-
posal, H.R. 16462, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
28. 115 CONG. Ric. 5186 (daily ed. May 14, 1969).
29. See, e.g., R. VAN DEURXN, Comments Regarding Proposed Federal Legisla-
tion Affecting Qualified Employee Benefit Plans, 1968 TEXTBOOK, supra note 1, at 234;
A. HEss, The Legislative Shadow Lengthens, 1968 TtX'TBOOK, supra note 1, at 410.
[VOL. 15 : p. 527
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pension system or its continued existence as merely an adjunct to
the Social Security system.80 They argue that the individual fund
should be free to regulate its own destiny according to the judgment
of its trustees and in the light of its own peculiar industry and problems.
Even among some opponents of legislation and many neutrals, there
exists a recognition that some key provisions of several proposed bills
are meritorious, and if not enacted into law should nevertheless be
made part of the funds' mode of operations by private action."'
There are major problems in the private pension system today.
Loss of pension benefits is one of them. Since there is pending legis-
lation, it is essential now to consider these problems and propose
solutions that could be embodied in the new law. Some changes will
be made. If they are to be within the framework of the present system,
rather than a sweeping away of it, they should be made now and must
be responsive to need. A surgeon's scalpel, not a butcher's cleaver,
is needed. Some adjustments to the system could rectify this most
serious problem of loss of pension benefits without destroying the
entire system.
III. CAUSES OF Loss OF PENSION BENEFITS
A. Individual Actions
Pension benefits may be lost as a result of certain acts occurring
or failing to occur to groups or because of individual activity alone.
Such acts may be volitional or not. Thus, an individual may forfeit
all benefits if he quits his job or if he dies. Individuals acting together,
as, for example, a vote for decertification of a bargaining representa-
tive, also affect end results. And loss of pension benefits may arise
from entirely extrinsic circumstances, as, for instance, when a com-
pany takes certain actions, i.e., to close down, move, lay off workers,
or to terminate part of its production. The major causes of loss of pen-
sion benefits due to individual actions are examined immediately below:
1. Death
The most obvious and irrevocable occurrence which can cause
deprivation of pension benefits is death. Under provisions of certain
plans death benefits may be payable if the individual has a vested
interest in the plan or has attained a required number of years of
30. See, e.V'., Yanis, Integration of Pension, Profit-Sharing, and Stock Bonus
Plans with Social Security, PSNSION & WZLVAas Niws, April 1969, at 19; A. Hess,
note 29 supra.
31. Levin, supra note 25, at 29.
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service. 82 However, if an individual dies prior to putting in the mini-
mum time required, there is no benefit payable to his family by the
fund. Even where the employee has had contributions made for his
account and is vested, his death before retirement may deprive his
estate of any benefits. There is no universal acceptance of the prin-
ciple that a pension fund pay out death benefits for participants,
whether vested or not, nor is there any legal compulsion to do so.
2. Disability
The employee may lose pension benefits as a result of disabling
illness or severe accident. If an individual is unfortunate enough to
become ill or to be the victim of an accident prior to vesting, he would
lose all benefits unless the plan which covers him provides disability
benefits. Even where disability benefits are provided by the trust in-
denture, many years of service may be required before the individual
is eligible. While attainment of full retirement age may not be neces-
sary, some vesting may be required to qualify for benefits. 8
3. Voluntary Termination
An individual may lose his pension benefits by simply quitting his
job.84 If the individual were not vested, 5 he would forfeit all benefits.
If a twenty-year vesting provision exists and the individual has nine-
teen years of service before leaving, he receives no retirement pay.
All of his work performed over the nineteen years would be completely
valueless 6 in terms of pension benefits.
32. See G. HURD, Death & Disability Benefits under Multi-Employer Negotiated
Plans, 1968 TAXTBOOK, supra note 1, at 178; see also M. BxRNSTIN, supra note 5,
at 33; Dickenson, supra note 17.
33. In many plans a Social Security disability award may be required to evidence
disability. That criterion is inability to hold any gainful employment. As a result,
an individual may not be disabled enough to be qualified for Social Security and con-
sequently he does not get a pension from the private sector. Nevertheless, he may
be sufficiently disabled to preclude his continuing in his pre-disability job. If he can-
not do so he may cease to be a participant in "covered employment." Thus, no further
contributions will be made for him, and he may lose all pension benefits without
qualifying for disability.
34. In Burgess v. First Nat'l Bank, 219 App. Div. 361, 367, 220 N.Y.S. 134,
139 (1927), the terms of the "endowment fund" expressly provided that any employee
voluntarily leaving the employer's service without his written consent would forfeit
his benefit entitlement under the fund. The plaintiff, who had sought but failed to
obtain consent, and quit anyway, was held not entitled to benefits.
35. Vesting has been defined as "the attainment by a participant of a benefit right,
attributed to employer contributions, that is not contingent upon a participant's con-
tinuation in specified employment." D. McGiLL, Language of Pensions, 1968 TzXTBOOK,
supra note 1, at 147, 151.
36. The employee may not be entitled to benefits when he leaves his employer,
but if vested, his entitlement is converted into payments at a specified age. Vesting is
not required by current law. Senator Javits' original bill (S. 1103, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1968) :
[Wlould have permitted two different types of vesting: full vesting at age 45
after 15 years or 50 percent vesting after 10 years and 5 percent per year there-
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It can be persuasively maintained that forfeiting pension benefits
if a job is left after three or four years or less is no great hardship.
These very forfeitures, on an actuarial basis, are applied to increase
the pension of the individuals who actually retire. But when the period
of time lengthens to nineteen or twenty-four years the logic is diluted.
In some plans an individual must work a certain number of years and
be a particular age to retire with benefits."7 Voluntary termination
of employment is not always the result of truly free choice. A relative
who must move to a different climate for health reasons, family
obligations, inability to find adequate housing, etc., all may force
an employee to quit.
Pending legislation to require some vesting minimum would par-
tially alleviate this problem. However, as shall be demonstrated, it
would not do it in all cases. And the legislation is far from assured
of passing.38 This country has a volatile, highly mobile labor force
which has a high propensity for job-changing."9 Relinquishing em-
ployment at one company for a job at another is a prime cause of
benefit forfeiture under most plans, especially where the employee's
rights have not yet vested.
To deal with this, portability 0 and reciprocity 4' are crescents in
the discussion of new pension plan legislation; but some steps in this
direction have already been taken by pension plans privately. Thus, of
the approximately 1300 negotiated multiemployer plans, covering about
5 million workers, in operation today,42 reciprocity agreements now
cover about half the workers enrolled in such funds. 43 A small number
of unions - United Mine Workers, Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America, International Ladies' Garment Workers, and International
after, also at age 45. "Upon further reflection [the Senator continued], I have
become convinced that deferred graded vesting is preferable to full vesting at a
given point of time since it eliminates the possibility that a worker can be forced
to lose all his pension benefits just because he was laid off or quit 1 day before
all his benefits were scheduled to vest. Under the present bill [S. 2167], no
benefits would have to vest for 6 years. At the end of the 6th year of continuous
service, 10 percent of benefits would have to vest, with an additional 10 percent
for each year thereafter until full vesting occurs after 15 years."
115 CONG. Rnc. 5188 (daily ed. May 14, 1967).
37. For example, a plan might require that an individual have 20 years' service
and be 65 years at retirement; or it may require service plus "covered" employment
for five years prior to retirement.
38. The House General Subcommittee on Labor did not even commence hearings
on H.R. 1045 and 1046 until December 10, 1969. 4 NAT'L FOUND. LnG. Lis. Rzp. 2
(Jan. 1970).
39. See, e.g., Labor Turnover Rates in Manufacturing 1959 to Date, MONTHLY
LAB. Riv., June 1969, at 97 (Table).
40. Portability means the right to move or transfer pension credits from one job
to another because of a plan or legislation. See generally Bernstein, Transferable
Credits and Clearing House Devices, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 765.
41. Reciprocity refers to agreements among individual union pension funds which
permit the exchange of pension credits. See Kolodrubetz, note 21 supra.
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id. at 24.
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Brotherhood of Electrical Workers - have established national, indus-
try-wide plans. 44  The Laborers International Union has recently
created a nationwide multilateral reciprocity agreement, to which forty
funds, with over 300,000 members, are signatories.45  The Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Teamsters pension fund has
negotiated bilateral reciprocity agreements with dozens of smaller
funds, as well as with the large Western Conference of Teamsters
fund.46 A multilateral nationwide reciprocity agreement was negotiated
in 1967.17 This voluntary reciprocity only covers a fraction of in-
dividuals covered by pensions today.
4. Discharge48
An individual may lose his pension benefits because of discharge.
If an employee's discharge is subsequently upheld after arbitration it
is presumably justified. But does the punishment fit the crime? Con-
sider for example, an individual who has worked for a company for
nine years and has been late eight times in a two-month period. His
union may not think it can defend him successfully and consequently
may not file a grievance. Or it may go to arbitration and lose.49 An
observer's concept of justice may not be offended by this, since the
man cannot properly perform his work. But is the observer, the arbi-
trator, or even the employer aware that a discharge can mean a loss
of between five and fifteen thousand dollars to the man? This is really
a "fine," imposed because of his absenteeism. Nine years of pension
contributions may be forfeited as a result of the discharge."0 This
may be particularly exasperating to the individual and the union
leaders since pension contributions and fringe benefits are frequently
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. As the term is used in this section, discharge is "for cause" when predicated
upon the actions of the individual employee. Group discharges resulting from sale,
dissolution, and merger are discussed later.
49. An arbitrator may consider discharge for lateness a proper exercise of man-
agement prerogative, provided the company is uniform in its treatment of offenders.
50. In effect the employer is often the beneficiary of the de facto "fine" imposed
on the dischargee to the extent that under many plans, the employer's liability for
future contributions is reduced by the amount of forfeited contributions. See Gorr v.
Consolidated Foods, Inc., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772 (1958).
51. Many union leaders argue with some justification that pension payments are
a form of deferred compensation which their members have elected to receive in lieu
of immediate remuneration in their pay envelopes. This argument is particularly valid
where a pension is the result of collective bargaining. Many employers are willing,
even anxious, to increase pay and avoid fringe benefits. Given a choice, the manage-
ment negotiators may be happier to add 10 cents per hour to wages than to contribute
it to a pension plan. In fact, usually it is the union which pushes for the 10 cents to
be added to pension. Consider the example given in the text. After nine years of
work a man, due to personal problems, cannot get to work on time. If the man has
worked two thousand hours per year - a realistic average - the man has labored a
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bargained for in lieu of wages.5 1 Increasingly, legislators, courts,5 2 and
arbitrators"8 have deemed these benefits to be deferred compensation.
5, Promotion
Ironically, an individual may forfeit his entire pension benefit by
being promoted into a higher paying position with management or the
union. If he ceases to be a production worker and becomes a super-
visor he will automatically leave the collective bargaining unit.
54
Contributions will no longer be made in his behalf. If his promotion
occurs prior to his being vested or if there are no vesting provisions
in the plan, then he loses all old age security as well as any interests
in the monies which were paid in for him. In the event that manage-
ment has a pension plan for its executives there may be some relief
for the individual. Many companies, however, do not have a plan for
management personnel; only for unionized or production employees.
Moreover, if such a plan did exist, the individual probably would not
be credited for the years in the collective bargaining unit. 5 He might
end up with years of service with the same company and yet not have
a pension because frequently there is no reciprocity between executives'
and collective bargaining unit pension plans.
total of 18,000 hours. If the contribution rate is 25 cents per hour, $4,500 has been
contributed for the individual. If the net interest, dividends, and realized and unrealized
capital gain on the contribution is an average of ten percent per year, the value of
contributions for the individual is close to $9,000. As a consequence of being late for
two months out of 108 months, the individual not only loses his job but $9,000. Had
he and his fellow union members elected not to have had a pension he would have
received the 25 cent per hour less the taxes thereon for the past nine years, and when
he was discharged there would have been no such financial penalty. It is interesting
to note that the trend of arbitrators' decisions has been to hold that holiday pay or
vacation entitlement is earned on a pro-rated basis. Most precedents indicate that -
barring contract wording to the contrary - if a man were fired in June and would
have been entitled to two weeks vacation July 1, he would be entitled to the pro-rated
share, i.e., l'Y2 ths of his vacation. "The legislative history of this provision, section
302(c) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1964), makes it clear that the sponsors
regarded pension contributions as employee compensation." Bernstein, supra note 5,
at 120. Senator Ball, who sponsored the amendment, stated that: "I have heard of
many cases in which unions have even relinquished wage demands in order to secure
a welfare fund, with a percentage of the payroll paid into the welfare fund .. "
NLRB, 2 LEGISLATIV HISTORY oF THn LABOR-MANAGXM4NT RLATIONS ACT or 1947
1305 (1948).
52. The Seventh Circuit stated in the Inland Steel case that: "While, as the
Company has demonstrated, a reasonable argument can be made that the benefits
flowing from such a plan are not 'wages,' we think the better and more logical argu-
ment is on the other side." 170 F.2d at 251.
53. There is a growing awareness among courts and arbitrators that severance
and vacation pay are forms of deferred compensation which are earned incrementally
during the course of employment. See, e.g., In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, 111 F.2d 429
(2d Cir. 1940) ; Botany Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 50 N.J. Super. 18, 141
A.2d 107 (1958) ; Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956);
In re Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 156 (1959).
54. But see A. Cox, Trustee Eligibility for Benefits, 1968 TEXTBOOK, supra
note 1, at 343, 344, wherein the author suggests a method of retaining coverage.
55. This is especially true if the employees' plan is negotiated and jointly adminis-
tered under section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186
(1964).
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6. Interrupted Employment
Individuals may terminate or interrupt their employment with the
company and lose all accrued pension benefits for several reasons
beyond their control. Military service obligation is an example. An
employee may leave because he is sent to jail. He may request a leave
of absence if he is elected to public office or becomes a union official.
In many situations, election to public or union office will prevent the
individual from returning to his job. If the plan is a vested one and
if the employee has not worked long enough to be vested, he com-
pletely forfeits all contributions made in his behalf; and if the plan
does not have vesting, then despite the number of years that the em-
ployee has worked for the employer he derives no benefit from the
contributions made for him.
All of the situations enumerated above concern an individual
rather than a group. The loss of benefits results from something that
the individual does or something that is done to him. Frequently the
external cause of the action is management, as in promotion or dis-
charge. Sometimes it may be a third party's activity, such as election
to public office or victimization in an accident. It may be the result
of the individual's volitional act, like quitting a job; or the result of
a force of nature completely beyond his control, for example, a stroke
resulting in total permanent disability, or a heart attack causing death.
B. Employee Collective Action
In the situations discussed here, the effect of forces is felt by
groups, not individuals. In some of the cases, i.e., decertification and
disaffiliation, it is the result of decisions made by the particular
individuals in concert with others. In later instances, it is primarily
the product of management action. And in some situations, e.g., cessa-
tion of payments or loss by trustee action, it is a result of the behavior
of both parties interacting or of third forces.
In summary, any one of a constellation of contingencies can
result in loss of pension benefits. The examples here are not just
theoretical. All of these situations actually occur with frequency in
the economic life of the country.
1. Decertification
If the incumbent union is decertified the employee and his fellow
workers may lose all benefits of the pension plan. A basic tenet of
prevailing labor law is that employees are free to select their own bar-
gaining representatives.6 To implement this, employees may engage
56. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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in free elections to determine which union, if any, shall represent
them.57 Similarly, employees have the right to oust a union they no
longer want.58
If an employee elects to decertify his union he may be thereby
voting to forego his pension. The result is the erection of a barrier
or counterbalance to the employee's wishes. In some cases an employee
must forfeit money if he votes to decertify a union whereas he would
keep the money if he did not so opt. If the pension plan were employer-
operated a problem might not arise. But if it were a joint labor-
management plan covering a single company, its future could be
jeopardized."9 The plan might be terminated upon decertification and
the assets distributed to the participants or transferred to a new trust
plan. Since the labor trustees would presumably be ousted union
officers, litigation is likely to ensue.
If the plan were industry-wide, the employees would have even
less chance of recovery because the trustees of an industry-wide plan
could contend that the former union members had forfeited rights
under the plan. Having legal title, the trustees could retain all funds
for the benefit of others in the industry. In fact, their attorneys might
advise that to surrender any funds or to partition the trust corpus
would be a breach of fiduciary responsibility.6" It is apparent that
this financial reward or deprivation based upon the exercise of choice
to select or reject a collective bargaining agent restricts industrial
freedom, is contrary to congressional intent, as expressed in section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act, and contravenes public policy.6 '
2. Disaffiliation
Schism,62 disaffiliation,68 or rearrangement of union configurations
can result in loss of pension benefits. Political freedom is thus dis-
57. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (A) (1964).
58. Id.
59. At least one court has held that it would be contrary to "justice and fairness"
to require an employer to continue to make contributions to a jointly-administered
pension trust after the employees had voted to decertify the union. Trustees of
Western Metal Industry Pension Fund v. United Control Corp., 4 N.B.P.C. 121
(Wash. Super. Ct. 1967) ; see also In re Ferris Sales and Service, Inc., and Amalga-
mated Local 5, 36 Lab. Arb. 848 (1960).
60. See Levin, supra note 25, at 28.
61. See N. LEvN, SUCCtSSVUL LABOR RELATIONs 226-30 (new rev. ed. 1967).
62. See, e.g., Hershey Chocolate Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, enforcement denied on
other grounds, 297 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1961). The "schism" doctrine provides that the
Board's "contract-bar" rule will be waived. A representation election will be held
during the contract period where there is a "basic intra-union conflict" over union
policy. See Mayer, A House Divided - The Schism Doctrine, 22 OIo ST. L.J. 154(1961) ; Rodgers, A Result: Union Division, 45 VA. L. Rv. 207 (1959) ; Summers,
Union Schism in Perspective: Flexible Doctrines, Double Standards, and Projected
Answers, 45 VA. L. Rv. 261 (1959).
63. Employees have "the right to 'bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing.' They have the right to designate. They have the right to revoke."
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couraged.64 Not only individuals, but groups or entire locals might
wish to join another union or to have their local or locals become
independent. 65 For example, five local unions in the Boston area are
members of an international union. Pension contributions which had
been negotiated many years ago are paid into a pension plan which
covers the entire eastern coast ranging from Maine to Florida. There
are ten trustees on this plan, five representing the union and five repre-
senting the contributing companies. Of the five union and management
trustees one each may come from the Boston area, but eight trustees
come from other areas in the Eastern coast region. The individuals in
the five locals in Boston may wish to withdraw from the international
union either to be independent or to join another union. If the dis-
affiliation occurs, all of the members in the disaffiliated locals may
lose their pension rights.66 Even those who voted against disaffiliat-
ing will be affected. Litigation would almost certainly result and it
is difficult to predict the outcome.
Under terms of the trust indenture it may be clear that the union
members who left have no further interest (beyond any vested credit)
in the fund.6 7 Principals of equity would dictate to the contrary. The
ensuing legal action would certainly be costly and prolonged. Equally
significant is the fact that the likelihood or threat of such action might
deter the disaffiliation which has the effect of negativing the votes
of a majority of the workers in the locals. Neither the union trustees
of the rejected union nor the employers who remain in contract with
the established union would be inclined to favor the disaffiliating locals.
Consequently, a payment to the withdrawing locals or partition of fund
assets to give a proportionate amount to the participants leaving the
international is as remote as the possibility of an amicable settlement
or reciprocity agreement.6
In unions, as elsewhere, control of the purse often determines
control of policy. When union configurations change there frequently
NLRB v. Mayer, 196 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1952). See Comment, The PropertyRights of Disaffiliating Local Unions in the Light of Public Policy, 37 FORD. L. Rzv.
252 (1968).
64. See Harker v. McKissock, 10 N.J. Super. 26, 76 A.2d 89 (App. Div. 1950),
modified, 7 N.J. 323, 81 A.2d 480 (1951).65. For a discussion of this area see Bradley v. O'Hare, 11 App. Div. 2d 15, 202N.Y.S.2d 141 (1960).
66. See Comment, note 63 supra.
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (A) (1964).68. Trustees have a fiduciary responsibility to safeguard the trust corpus. Absent
specific enabling language in the trust indenture, the disbursement of funds to non-participants without legal compulsion to do so, invites litigation by contributing em-ployers, employee participants, and beneficiaries for "giving away" the corpus. See,
e.g., Ulene v. Jacobsen, 209 Cal. App. 2d 139, 26 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1962), cited inNote, I GA. L. Rxv. 78, 94 (1966).
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results litigation with respect to rights in the treasury. As the New
Jersey Superior Court stated in Harker v. McKissock :69
The local's representative status over the years has been given
substance and vitality through the possession and use of the funds
and property contributed by its members for the purposes of
the representation. The loss of these funds and property would
threaten impairment, if not the throttling, of the local's perform-
ance of its representative functions and its organizing and bar-
gaining ability. The inevitable result may be a deterrent effect
on the employees' right of a free choice of representatives.
Under a "reverter" clause, 70 disaffiliation may divest the union
of its assets, and the membership of its benefit expectation under a
negotiated pension plan. 71 In a recent New Jersey case, Judge v.
Kortenhaus,7 2 the court refused to order the trustees of the existing
fund to transfer part of its assets to a new plan created for a group of
members in a new local carved out of the old one. In two New York
cases, such transfers were permitted. In Whelan v. O'Rourke,7"
approximately 1000 employees were transferred from one local to
another while in Nicolette v. Essenfeld,74 a new local was created.
It is particularly significant that in both situations the action was
taken in response to the mandate of the international union. 75 Conse-
quently, it cannot be generally stated that courts would take similar
action absent exactly similar circumstances. National unions possess
considerable discretionary latitude in directing their subordinate local
bodies.7" So long as they act within their constitutionally delineated
bounds, 77 in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor capricious, 7 s
they may consolidate and merge locals, alter their jurisdictions, and
69. 10 N.J. Super. 26, 40-41 76 A.2d 89, 96 (1950), modified, 7 N.J. 323, 81 A.2d
480 (1951) (emphasis added). ee also Comment, supra note 63, at 260.
70. "The reverter clause ... is a provision appearing in many union constitutions
which purports to control the disposition of money and other property of a local union,
which, for any reason, has severed its ties with the international. The clause typically
has these assets 'revert' to the international upon successful disaffiliation." Comment,
supra note 63, at 253 (footnotes omitted).
71. As a general rule, union membership as a condition of eligibility for receipt
of benefits from a negotiated pension plan is an interference with the statutory rights
of non-members. However, there may be particular situations where such a condition
is not violative of the non-members' statutory rights. See Coal Producers' Ass'n,
165 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 65 L.R.R.M. 1304 (June 13, 1967).
72. 79 N.J. Super. 574, 192 A.2d 320 (1967).
73. 5 App. Div. 2d 156, 170 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1958); see also P. THOMSON, 1967
TEXTBOOK, supra note 5, at 441.
74. 11 Misc. 2d 197, 171 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
75. It is upon this point, the assumed involuntariness of the transfer, that the
court in Kortenhaus based its refusal to order the transfer of funds - noting that it
was a voluntary decision by the local membership.
76. See, e.g., Cohn, The International and the Local Union, in N.Y.U. 11TH
ANN. CoN'. LAB. 7 (1958).
77. See Brewery Local 1345 v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 202 F. Supp. 464(E.D.N.Y. 1962).
78. See Dunne v. Hoffa, 231 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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create new locals, councils, or joint boards without judicial interven-
tion. The impact of local union realignment on negotiated joint pension
plans may be significant.
In the absence of reciprocity agreements 79 or the existence of an
industry-wide fund,8" trustees usually believe now that even if they
want to vote for a pro tanto transfer of funds to another local to
"follow" the erstwhile participants, 8' they should first obtain judicial
approval. The state of the law is such that this is the only safe path.
Barring such advance approval, participants remaining in the plan
could start action against the trustees for depleting trust assets and
thus breaching their fiduciary duty. And as the law presently stands,
it is difficult to predict that judges will approve a liberal and un-
orthodox view and hard to blame them if they refuse to direct certain
equitable but unprecedented and unconventional solutions.
C. Management Action
"Although pension plans are initiated as permanent programs,
they are subject to discontinuance, as is the existence of the sponsoring
company."" A recent joint Internal Revenue Service and Bureau of
Labor Statistics study analyzed the causes and effects of termination
and the characteristics of 8,069 qualified retirement plans closed out
between 1955 and 1965.83 Of these, 4,259 were pension plans cover-
ing 225,000 participants at the date of termination.84 Although a
variety of circumstances might lead to plan termination, the most
frequent reasons given were company and plan mergers, financial
difficulties, and business dissolution."'
1. Sale
The effects of a sale of a business is best presented by example.
Company A manufactures electrical appliances in a downtown metro-
politan area. It has 1,000 employees. These individuals are unionized
and contributions are made on their behalf to a joint labor-management
79. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
80. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
82. Beier, Termination of Pension Plans: 11 Years' Experience, MONTRLY LAB.
REv., June 1967, at 26.
83. The remaining 3,810 plans were profit-sharing (3,655), thrift (126), and
stock bonus (29). The author notes that this estimate does not account for employees
who lost their jobs, and unless vested, also lost their pension rights in a business
decline preceding termination.
84. Id.
85. Id. Merger or sale was given as the reason for termination in 1,276 instances(in 511 of which coverage was continued; coverage was not continued in 406 cases,
and coverage effect was unknown in 359 instances). Financial difficulties were reported
as the reason in 1,087 cases (25.5 percent); and business dissolution was given in
771 cases (18.1 percent). Id. at 27-28.
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fund. Company A buys Company B which makes electrical appliances
and is also unionized, but by a different union. B has made contribu-
tions to an industry-wide joint pension fund for its employees. A
having completed the purchase, gives up the lease on B's factory
premises and moves operations to A's owned facility. Efficiencies may
be effected resulting in the redundancy of some individuals, but essen-
tially all the employees of B - some 300 - who want to go to A
will be allowed to move in. The operations of B will be fully assimi-
lated into A. Former employees of both companies did and will do
similar jobs - it is impossible and impractical to keep B's operations
as a separate department. A has a union shop and all previous B
employees will be expected to join A's union.86 The A pension plan
will be continued and contributions will be made for the new people
from B. However, all of their past service with B will be to no avail
for pension purposes . 7 Obviously, the A pension fund cannot "pick
up" past service credit for 300 people without a lump sum payment
being made into the pension plan to fund this. To give credit without
funding would be actuarially unsound and would jeopardize the entire
pension plan. Trustees who permitted this might well be considered
in dereliction of duty. Employer A has no legal obligation to make
such a lump sum payment to the A pension fund for the new employees.
It will treat them as any other newly hired employees and commence
pension plan contributions for them when they start work. The B
pension monies were paid into an industry-wide trust where vesting
was provided after 15 years. The trustees of the B pension fund have
no obligation, under the terms of their trust indenture, to deviate from
their rules and make special provisions for the people who are moving
out. If they were requested to make a lump sum payment either to
these people individually or collectively to the A pension fund they
would probably demur on the advice of their attorneys and actuaries.
Counsel would argue that without provisions in the trust agreement
such a "give away" contrary to trust rules, would be a violation of
fiduciary obligation and could open the trustees to surcharge and per-
sonal liability for misfeasance.8" The actuary would point out that his
figures are calculated on a planned "drop-out-rate" and that while
the loss of 300 people was not anticipated, nevertheless, it would result
in a major benefit to the fund. The sudden withdrawal of participants
for whom thousands of dollars of contributions had been deposited
86. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
87. See Kolodrubetz, supra note 21, at 26. Past service credit is a difficult problem
even for funds of different locals within the same international union.
88. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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would mean a windfall for the fund"9 and presumably, more security
for the workers who remain covered by it. Moreover, under presently
prevailing legal interpretations the B fund would not be deemed to
terminate, even partially, as to these employees. 90 Finally, political
realities do not suggest any motivation for the union trustees who
have just lost the 300 members and no longer represent these people
to risk litigation over them. A majority of employer representatives,
if not all of them, never knew the people and have no reason to take
responsibility for them once they are no longer participants in the
plan. The B workers probably do not have even one advocate serving
as a trustee. As a consequence the few B workers who have over 15
years of service, would be vested. All of the others would lose all
benefits for the pension contributions previously made on their behalf.
This kind of situation may frequently occur. Jurisdiction in cer-
tain industries is not confined to a particular international union. If
A's union and B's union were in the same international, but belonged
to separate funds, it is possible that some negotiations between the
funds could ensue which would result in reciprocity."x But even within
one international, different union officials with different constituencies
might not come to an agreement. If the unions are not related, the
chance of an accommodation is even more remote.9s
89. Contributing employers also stand to benefit from the forfeitures in terms of
reduced future contribution liability, or conversely, an increased employee benefit
potential at the equivalent contribution rate.
90. "In its broadest signification 'termination' means the ending of the plan. One
form is the achievement of the plan's purpose by retirement of the last eligible em-
ployee. As used ... here, 'termination' means the ending of the plan before that point,
often substantially before fulfillment of the plan." Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights
When Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals, 76 HARV. L. Rzv. 952 n.1(1963). If the courts would declare at least a partial termination of the plan, the
affected employees would acquire an immediate vested interest in the plan or secure a
distribution of its assets.
91. See Kolodrubetz, note 21 supra.
92. Problems such as these are not rare with the union structure in the United
States as it is today. Many examples can be given: The Textile Workers Union of
America and the United Textile Workers Union compete for essentially the samejurisdiction. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the International
Union of Electrical Workers, The Utility Workers and the United Electrical Workers
all may organize in the same fields. The National Maritime Union and the Seafarer's
International Union organize sailors. There is a United Garment Workers Union of
America, as well as an International Ladies Garment Workers Union. And the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America may clash on jurisdiction with both of
these. In the paper and packaging industry, there exist three unions that will assertjurisdiction, United Papermakers & Paperworkers; Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill
Workers and Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America. There is
a Retail Clerks International Association and a Retail, Wholesale & Department Store
Union. There is Transit Workers Union and an Amalgamated Transit Union. In the
hospital field in New York both Local 1199, Drug and Hospital Workers, R.D.W.S.U.
and the Building Service Employees represent workers.
Even in seemingly dissimilar areas jurisdictional disputes can occur. Thus,
theoretically, both a shoe-workers' union and a union representing salespeople may
clash over who represents salesmen in a shoe store. And an office workers union and
a garment union may clash over who represents clericals in a dress factory. There
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If the B workers pension fund was industry-wide, representing
many plants in the region, or the entire industry, the workers might
be worse off than if the fund was a single-company one existing for
B's workers only. This is ironic since it is usual for industry-wide
funds to provide greater security than individual company funds. A
single company fund, whether Taft-Hartley or unilateral, would prob-
ably have provisions in the trust indenture providing that, upon the
termination of the business, the trust is also to be terminated and
distribution made, in accordance with its provisions. Thus the B
workers would realize something. In an industry-wide fund there
would be no termination either in the whole or in part, in all likelihood.
2. Merger
In this situation the effects upon pension plans are similar to a
sale. The resulting consequence of a merger on the workers is the
same. Consider the following hypothetical case. Company 0 had 18
workers, a location in Brooklyn, and a contract with a union that
called for pension contributions. Company X with 40 employees had
its plant in Connecticut and had a contract with a local of an inde-
pendent union which also called for pension payments. Both unions
had union-shop clauses in their contracts with the employees making
are mechanisms for solving jurisdictional disputes among AFL-CIO unions, butprocedures would not necessarily solve pension problems under discussion here since
no jurisdictional dispute might be involved.Major unions are outside of the AFL-CIO including the InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, the United Auto Workers, the United Mine Workers, theUnited Electrical Workers, etc. Between these and AFL-CIO unions there is hardly
any grievance settling mechanism. The Teamsters with about 2,000,000 members
will, for practical purposes, assert jurisdiction in many areas. Thus, they may comeinto conflict with dozens of AFL-CIO unions set up on either a craft or industrialbasis. District 50, formerly U.M.W. and District 65, formerly R.D.W.S.U., similarly
cut across conventional lines. Finally, there is a host of small independent locals orfederations of locals that assert jurisdiction in one or more fields and some that will
organize in any. Against this background it is easy to see how a merger of twofacilities can lead to job displacement or pension loss. There is no assurance that
employees engaged in similar work will be represented by the same union.Accelerated mergers of unions will, to a limited extent, ease the problem. In1969, the two unions covering bakery and confectionary workers merged. One hadbeen affiliated with the AFL-CIO, the other had not. In recent years the MeatCutters and Packinghouse Workers merged, and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Unionjoined the United Steel Workers.
93. A typical set of priorities in the event of termination would be as follows:1. Monies be segregated to assure sufficient payments for present pensioners.2. Those eligible for normal pension be permitted to retire and sufficient
monies be put aside for them.
3. Monies be put aside for those eligible for early retirement.
4. Funds be allocated for individuals with a vested interest who not yethave sufficient service for retirement.5. The balance of funds, if any, be distributed in some equitable fashion
among the participants. It is conceivable that workers with less than15 years of service would get some lump sum payments. The trust mighthave a provision requiring at least a minimum number of years of servicebefore participation in this class 5 distribution. In an industry-wide plan,if the individual had not vested, and if there was no provision for
severance pay, then the individual would get nothing.
SPRING 1970]
23
Clark: The Court and Its Critics
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
each the exclusive bargaining agent. The principal shareholders of
Company 0 took stock in X in return for the assets of 0. The union
at Company 0 and the one presently at Company X asserted, based
upon their respective collective bargaining agreements, that they were
the exclusive representative for bargaining purposes of the entire new
unit. Neither union requested an election at the combined unit to
determine which was the bargaining agent.94 Company O's manage-
ment bargained with the 0 union on the impact of the move9" but it
was impossible to achieve a mutually agreeable settlement. The 0
union could now complain, inter alia, about its members' loss of pension
benefits. It could file suit in state or federal district court, seek arbi-
tration, or go to the NLRB. Both the 0 union pension plan and the
X union pension plan are multi-employer joint industry-wide plans.
Thus, even if it had been agreed that the employees at 0 could go
over to X with their same pay rates, seniority, etc., they could not
carry with them credit for pension contributions. If under the 0
pension plan none of the 18 individtals had vested, their forfeiture of
accrued service credits would be complete.
3. Facility Consolidation
Corporation X has two plants, Plant No. 1 and Plant No. 2. Each
plant has a separate union. Both are in antiquated, uneconomic facili-
ties. Their operations may be identical or similar. Corporation X
arranges for a modern new facility and moves operations of No. 1 and
No. 2 into the new building. Workers in Plant No. 1 were covered by
an industry-wide pension plan. After the amalgamation, the workers
from Plant No. 1 might lose all pension credits paid in for them. This
would occur if:
a) After a plant-wide election the voters voted for "no union."
b) After a plant-wide election the voters selected the union
originally representing the workers at Plant No. 2 and
this union does not have a pension plan at all.
c) After a plant-wide election the voters selected the union
originally representing the workers at Plant No. 2 which
does have a pension plan, but for which Plant No. 1
workers are not granted any credited service.96
94. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 568, Southern Conf. v. Red Ball Motor Freight,
Inc., 374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967).
95. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1967) ; see also Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (Oct.
27, 1966).
96. After such an amalgamation of units a new election might be called for by
either union or the employer. See note 95 supra.
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Obviously, if factors were reversed and the union representing
workers at Plant No. 1 instead of at Plant No. 2 were chosen, then
the same problems might exist for workers at Plant No. 2. Conse-
quently, whatever the outcome of the election, one group of employees,
which had previously been covered for pensions might lose them.
There could be no election outcome which would protect all employees
from the viewpoint of preserving all past pension benefits.
4. Plant Removal
Company A which has its facilities in the North decides to move
to the South.91 Many of the workers because of age, family connec-
tions, property ownership, personal proclivities, etc., do not wish to
move even if they are invited to do so. The result is that all pension
benefits earned by these people may be forfeited. 8
If the plan is a single-company plan, management may choose
not to terminate it since several of its plants at other locations may
be covered. If the plant is the only one that the company has, it still
may choose not to terminate it, but, rather, to keep it in operation for
the benefit of those employees who do move along with the company,
figuring this will be an incentive to retain key employees.
Finally, it is important to note that if the company's contribution
was to a multi-employer plan then there would be no question of termi-
nation. The employees who were employed by the company would
forfeit all of the benefits (to the extent that they were not vested)
unless they could find employment at another company which was
a participant in the same pension plan.
5. Termination of Business
If a company ceases operations entirely the result would be sub-
stantially the same as if it had moved, except the worker would have
no chance of relocating and keeping his job. If it were a single-com-
pany plan it would terminate99 and individuals might or might not get
97. It is posited here that this is not a runaway shop situation, and that there is
not a "no-moving clause" in either of which events an arbitrator or the NLRB might
direct corrective action for those employees injured by the move. See, e.g., Garwin
Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (June 28, 1965), enforced in Garment
Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
98. It is now generally accepted that seniority rights do not survive plant removal.
See Charland v. Norge Division, Borg-Warner Corp., 407 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1969) ;
see also Local 1251, UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968),
overruling Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961).
99. Even this proposition is by no means certain. In George v. Haber, 343 Mich.
218, 72 N.W.2d 121 (1955), the employer, Kaiser-Frazer Motors, had closed down
its primary production facility at Willow Run and curtailed its business elsewhere
preparatory to abandoning the automobile business in the United States. The former
employees brought an action in equity for a judicial declaration of termination and
vesting of service credits. In essence, they wished to have benefits paid to the retirees
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lump sum payments. Assuredly most would get nothing close to the
extent of the personal protection which they had anticipated. 100 Under
these circumstances, the losses to the employees may be substantial.
Pension plans, with few exceptions, limit an employer's liability to the
amount of his pension contributions. Deficits in the plan's funding are
not chargeable against corporate assets, even if the plan defaults. As a
result, the plan's participants will suffer if there is a deficiency upon
termination unless their pension credits can be transferred to another
plan. Available funds remaining in the plan on termination are allo-
cated among the participants, frequently with long-service personnel
receiving a priority.
A case in point is the Studebaker plan termination. When
the Studebaker plant in South Bend, Ind., was closed and the
pension plan terminated, workers with at least 10 years of service
and age 60 or over - i.e., those retired or eligible to retire - lost
no benefits. Workers with 10 years of service or more and be-
tween ages 40 and 59 - those with vested rights to benefits -
received 15 percent of the value of their accrued benefits. The
rest of the participants - those without vested rights - re-
ceived nothing.'
Eighty-five hundred employees were affected by the termination of
the Studebaker retirement plan ;102 some tragically, as "when one em-
ployee who was 59 years old and had worked for Studebaker for 43
years, starting at the age of 16, forfeited 85 percent of his pension
rights." And he was not alone, for there were 20 other Studebaker
employees, each with more than 40 years of service, who were in
the same boat.'0 8
If the company made contributions to an industry-wide or multi-
employer plan, the cessation of the company's business would not
have any substantial effect on the operation of the multi-employer
pension plan. The individuals would receive coverage only in the
and to distribute, as vested, the remainder of the $6,000,000 fund to the other par-
ticipants on a pro rata basis (on an hours worked formula). The trial court enteredjudgment for the defendant and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter
alia, that the purpose of the pension fund was to pay pension and disability benefits;
and that it could not be diverted from its purpose. The court emphasized that, under
the express provisions of the plan, monies paid into the fund were not to constitute
wages, salary, or compensation to any individual employee. This case has been
criticized on the factual grounds that: (1) 95 percent of the company's 11,000 em-
ployees had been separated; (2) the 450 employees on the payroll at the time of suit
were discharged soon thereafter; (3) the plan's actuary stated in an affidavit before
the court that no more than one-third of the fund was needed for all of the existing
and potential claims of the existing employees; and (4) neither the union nor the
company ever declared the plan terminated. See M. BFRNSTPIN, supra note 5, at 343;
see also notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
100. See Beier, supra note 82, at 29.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 115 CONG. Rvc. 5187 (daily ed. May 14, 1969) (remarks of Senator Javits).
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event that they could obtain employment with a company that con-
tributed to the same plan as their former employer. As a practical
matter this might be difficult, particularly in rural and other non-urban
areas. A multi-employer fund may have dozens of contributing em-
ployers in New York City or other metropolitan areas. 104 But it fre-
quently has contributing companies who are the only employers of
participants in a certain community. Thus, one international union
pension plan with over 200 contributing employers has only one single
plant in the entire State of Mississippi.' An industry-wide plan
covering workers in the textile dyeing and printing industry has close
to 20,000 participants.' 0 6 About 7,000 of these come from the metro-
politan New York-New Jersey area where there are over one hundred
contributing employers. However, dotted throughout Connecticut,
Massachusetts, downstate New Jersey and upstate New York are
contributing firms that are the only businesses in their towns engag-
ing in textile processing which contribute to the industry's pension
fund. If mills in Paterson or Brooklyn closed down, displaced em-
ployees would have at least some chance of obtaining covered em-
ployment. But if a facility were the single plant in a community,
workers would be faced with a choice of (a) not obtaining covered
employment, (b) moving their homes and families, or (c) long, costly,
and impractical commuting every day.
Even where employment is clustered in a particular area, re-
employment may prove difficult. Employment opportunities in certain
industries may be diminishing on a nationwide basis or in a particular
geographical area."0 7
6. Lay-off
Even though a company does not close its entire operations it
may terminate the employment of some of its personnel due to a
104. Reciprocity agreements may serve the same purpose as a multi-employer fund.
In the construction industry there has been considerable activity toward establishing
reciprocity arrangements among independent pension funds of the same union. Most
agreements have been restricted to large metropolitan areas. The Carpenters Joint
Council of New York City, for example, adopted a reciprocity arrangement covering
five neighboring Carpenter plans in 1965, reaching some 50,000 workers. The Car-
penter plans in Detroit and Chicago are limited within their vicinity, while the
California Carpenters arrangement encompasses all their plans within the state, as well
as plans in neighboring states. Kolodrubetz, Reciprocity and Pension Portability,
MONTHLY LAB. RZv., Sept. 1968, at 24.
105. IUE-AFL-CIO Pension Fund.
106. Textile Workers Pension Fund, 130 Clinton Street, Brooklyn, New York.
107. In the textile-finishing industry in New York City in 1954 there were 1,700
people employed and covered by the industry's pension fund. By 1969, the number of
employees in the industry had contracted to 1,200. If, as in 1968, a company discon-
tinued operations and terminated 100 covered employees, it is difficult to see how they
would be able to obtain employment within the industry in order to protect their
pension credits, since job opportunities were increasingly limited.
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qualitative or quantitative change in its operations. It may decide to
subcontract-out work that was formerly done by members of the bar-
gaining unit. A department store which previously had a houseclean-
ing and maintenance department may decide it is more efficient and
economical to hire an outside cleaning contractor to do the job. The
present employees who do the work may be laid off and lose benefits.
Even if these people are immediately re-employed by the outside con-
tractor, it may not solve the problem of loss of pension benefits. They
now have a new employer - the cleaning contractor - not the depart-
ment store. The building-service concern may have no union, or a
union which, in all likelihood, would be different from the department
store's union. These people could not transfer their past service credits
from one fund to another even if there were such a pension fund.
A company may lay-off people because it decides to discontinue
an entire operation, deeming it uneconomical.' It may contract-out
a particular phase of production or service, such as delivery opera-
tions, °9 die-cutting, data processing, etc. But if there is no anti-union
animus" ° and if the lay-off is for bona fide economic reasons, there
will be no relief for the employees. As a consequence, large groups of
workers may have their employment terminated because of decisions
affecting the policy of the business.
There are routine lay-offs of employees due to changes in seasonal
patterns of work, because business drops off or for other reasons. The
laid-off employees may be recalled, but, in the intervening unemploy-
ment, time is lost for pension purposes. If lay-offs occur with fre-
quency, the employees, seeing no future in the job, may give it up.
Employees who are laid off are generally those most likely to have no
vested interest in the pension plan.
D. Other Causes of Loss of Pension Benefits
1. Cessation of Payments
Under certain circumstances a company may cease making con-
tributions to a pension fund. If the company has a collective bar-
gaining agreement with the union, it is possible that at contract
negotiating time the parties agree to abandon the pension contributions
for a variety of reasons: e.g., most people in the unit might be young
and prefer a current wage increase as opposed to pension contributions
108. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960) (maintenance work).
109. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 110 (8th Cir.. 1965).
110. Not relevant to this discussion is consideration of partial -closure motivated
by anti-union animus, and with the intent to chill unionism elsewhere in the organiza-
tion. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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and ask for a conversion of pension contributions into take-home pay;
or the company may be undergoing a period of financial hardship and
be permitted to forgo pension contributions. Still another reason
why contributions may cease arises when a company and union decide,
after a short experience in an industry-wide plan, to withdraw from
it and set up their own single company plan."' While complete cessa-
tion of contributions is not very common, it does, nevertheless, occur
and must be included in this discussion. The result of this kind of
action is to freeze the pension, protecting the vested, but preventing
any further vesting.
Payments for contributions will cease in the event of a failure by
the employer to sign a new collective bargaining agreement. 12 A
strike or lock-out may result in temporary or permanent cessation of
contributions being made for certain groups of employees. Where a
union has been decertified during the term of a collective bargaining
agreement, the employer's obligation to make contributions to the
joint pension fund may be deemed to terminate. Although decertifica-
tion does not necessarily invalidate the labor contract, one court has
held that it would be contrary to "justice and fairness" to require the
employer to make contributions to a jointly administered pension trust
after the relationship between the union, the company and the workers
has been severed. The court found that there was no valid reason to
require payments, inasmuch as the pension trust was originally estab-
lished for the benefit of employees whom the union once represented." 3
Bankruptcy or other forms of financial insolvency which might affect
an employer would also result in an end to payments to a pension fund
even if a contract required such payments." 4
2. Loss by Trustee Action
Many plans, at certain given points in time, do not have sufficient
funds to fully discharge all of their liabilities. This is particularly true
of newer plans which have not had the time to "amortize" this liability.
If such a plan were suddenly forced to terminate, a deficit would
theoretically exist. A substantial unfunded liability is most usually
111. When a single-employer plan decides to merge into an industry-wide pension
plan, there is usually no accompanying loss of benefits to the participants. The fund's
assets are generally transferred to the larger industry-wide fund, which in return
"picks up" the past service credits of the transferred participants. Where such an
arrangement cannot be accomplished, the single-employer plan is declared terminated,
thereby vesting or freezing all interests in it. Coverage under the larger plan is then
effective as of the date of transfer of the employees.
112. See Hann v. Harlow, 271 F. Supp. 674 (D. Ore. 1967).
113. Trustees of Western Metal Industry Pension Fund v. United Control Corp.,
4 N.B.P.C. 121 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1967) ; see also Ferris Sales and Service, Inc. and
Amalgamated Local 5, 36 Lab. Arb. 848 (1960).
114. See, e.g., In re Dugan, 29 Misc. 2d 980, 222 NY.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
SPRING 1970]
29
Clark: The Court and Its Critics
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
created when a plan is established and gives participants either full
or partial credit for earlier service. Additional unfunded liability is
most often undertaken as subsequent, and more liberal, amendments
to the plan's eligibility requirements are made."' Some plans make
no provision for liquidation of unfunded liability, while others provide
for unfunded liability to be funded over a 50 year period. Some make
provision for shorter funding periods. While the President's Com-
mission and some legislators have recommended a 30 year funding
period, opponents of a fixed and uniform funding life argue that even
30 years may be too long for a small single company plan, even though
it is amply safe for a multi-employer industry-wide plan.
The assets of a plan may be inadequate to satisfy all of its obliga-
tions in the event of a termination because of investment losses, failure
of the employer to make contributions, as in insolvency, or adverse
actuarial errors resulting from an overly optimistic projection of a
plan's income or an understatement of its liabilities.116 Many people
who grew to financial maturity in the past twenty years have, until
recently, regarded the stock market as something which over the long
term only rises. Yet, as this article is written, many trust fund port-
folios have substantial losses, with market values below cost values.
Today, in a rare phase of economic history both stocks and fixed in-
come items, i.e., bonds, are at a lower point than they have been in
several years. Traditionally safe U.S. Government bonds are even
selling at substantial discounts from their issue prices. If overly opti-
mistic actuaries included unrealized gains in their actuarial assumption,
they may now find they were too liberal and that their projections
cannot support the benefits.
115. Beier, supra note 82, at 28.
116. Id. at 29.
Aside from well-publicized cases, only the most fragmentary data are avail-
able on the extent of participant losses of expected benefits through plan termina-
tion. IRS termination records do not contain the information needed to determine
the frequency and magnitude of accrued benefit losses. In an effort to obtain some
information, reports filed under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
were examined for a group of 99 terminated plans, each with 100 participants or
more. Due to one deficiency or another, rough estimates of the extent of potential
participant losses could be made for only 26 of the plans.
By comparing assets to liabilities, it was evident that in 10 of the 26 plans
some participant losses were incurred. These 10 plans had slightly over 10,000
members, including 8,500 reported by Studebaker. The assets of these plans, as a
group, averaged about one-half of their reported liabilities, but benefit losses
probably averaged less than this fraction suggests. Six other plans, with 2,400
members, also reported insufficient assets to fund their accrued liabilities; however,
there were no apparent losses since the participants were transferred to other
plans. The remaining 10 plans, with 2,300 members, appeared to be fully or almost
fully funded; if any losses occurred in these instances they were probably nominal.
These 26 plans may have been more thoroughly funded than the typical terminat-
ing plan because they were older and, consequently, had a longer opportunity to
improve their funding positions.
Id. at 29-30.
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Misfeasance or mismanagement by trustees, or their outright lar-
ceny or misappropriation of funds can bankrupt pension plans. Invest-
ment policies, no matter how prudent they seem, in hindsight, may
deplete the fund's assets to the extent that its reserves are insufficient
to meet the current and anticipated demands on the fund. Losses
on equity or debt investment or poor security for loans may also
jeopardize a fund.'
All of the foregoing indicate the tremendous responsibility placed
on trustees, who, as fiduciaries, must be prudent and wise. Bonding
and the developing use of errors and omissions insurance policies will,
to some limited extent, alleviate the risk in these situations. But the
utilization of these insurance policies is not yet widespread, nor accept-
able as a concept by all trustees and/or their advisors.
"Trustees, in the last analysis, are the judges of what particular
person is or is not eligible for benefits. Especially in the case of larger
trusts these determinations take the form of policy decisions which
apply to many cases and not just a single situation.""' Benefit eligi-
bility is, under the terms of the trust indenture, generally within the
sole discretion of the plan's trustees. In some industries, shrinking
employment, an aging labor force, and shifts in plant location have
caused an unanticipated and unforeseen diminution of fund assets.
As a consequence, trustees have had to tighten and to restrict eligi-
bility requirements.
Legal decisions indicate that trustees have considerable power in
changing eligibility requirements, providing their actions are not arbi-
trary or capricious."' Tightening of eligibility requirements may re-
sult in deprivation for groups of employees. In Gaydosh v. Lewis,"2 °
an employee who retired in 1950 had met all qualifications for retire-
ment except that he was 56 years old and would have to wait until he
was 60 to draw a pension. The United Mine Workers Welfare and
Retirement Fund had promulgated new rules in 1953, one year prior
to the retiree's 60th birthday. Under these regulations Gaydosh would
not be eligible for pension benefits since he was not working in covered
employment at a certain date. The administrator of Gaydosh's estate
brought suit against the trustees to compel payment, urging, inter alia,
that the trustees' action was arbitrary and capricious, that the retiree
was eligible and that his eligibility under the old requirements afforded
117. See, e.g., R. JAMES & E. JAMES, HOPFA AND THE TEAMSTERs 213-317 (1965).
118. Levin, Policy Making: The Duty of the Fund Trustee, PENSION & WELFARE
Ntws, Jan. 1968, at 33.
119. See Collins v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare & Retirement
Fund, 298 F. Supp. 964, 968 (D.D.C. 1969), citing Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Kennet v. UMW, 183 F.
Supp. 315, 317 (D.D.C. 1960).
120. 410 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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him (or his estate) an equitable right which the court would protect.
The district court granted the trustees' motion for summary judgment.
The circuit court indicated its refusal to interfere with trustees' dis-
cretionary activities under the mandate of the trust indenture, so long
as they are not "abusive and 'despotic' powers which tend to prostitute
the spirit of this Fund."' 1
In McCostis v. Nashua Pressmen Union,2 - the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire went even further. McCostis could have retired
from his work as a pressman on his 60th birthday. He had met
all eligibility requirements for a pension, i.e., 20 years in the in-
dustry and age 60. He chose to continue working and opted to retire
at age 63. His pension was denied him because in the interim the
union changed the eligibility qualification to require 25 years in the
industry and attainment of age 65. McCostis sued, claiming in effect,
that he had been fully vested and that what was, in effect, a retroactive
amendment should not deprive him of something which he counted
on or could have gotten earlier. Again, the court upheld the right of
the trustees to exercise control over trust eligibility.
These cases are discussed here not because individual rights are
involved, but because entire classes or groups of individuals could
be economically defenestrated by such trustee rulings. In light of
McCostis, which gives even greater power to trustees than Gaydosh,
some have started to consider what the courts' reaction would be to
trustees diminishing the amount of pension already being drawn by
someone vested, retired and on pension. In one very recent case the
Supreme Court of Washington took a more sympathetic view of the
pensioner and considered pension rights as vested if an individual is
in covered employment and fulfills his part of the bargain.12a However,
the issue before the court was not rearrangement of eligibility, but an
error by the plan's administrator.
In Miniard v. Lewis,' 24 the trustees were confronted with an
eligibility requirement which was susceptible to two readings. One of
these would have made the employee eligible for benefits. 25  The
121. Id. at 265. See also Sarnow v. Moving Picture Machine Operators' Local 306,
24 N.Y.2d 505, 249 N.E.2d 356, 301 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1969) (amendment of pension
plan pursuant to authority under union constitution).
122 - -..-.--N.H ......-248 A.2d 85 (1968).
123. Dorward v. I.L.W.U.-PMA Pension Plan, ____ Wash. , 452 P.2d 258
(1969).
124. 387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
125. The eligibility regulation in issue required that if an employee retired or
ceased to work in the industry prior to May 29, 1946, he would be eligible for a pension
only upon the completion of 20 years service in the industry subsequent to May 28,
1946. The applicant urged that the regulation be read to give him credit for 20 years
of service, regardless of when that service commenced, as long as the service ended
subsequent to May 28, 1946. Part of the applicant's 20 years of service was earned
prior to May 28, 1946. The trustees interpreted the regulation to mean 20 years of
continuous service, wholly performed after May 28, 1946.
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trustees chose the more restrictive one and their denial of benefits was
upheld as being neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court also re-
jected the applicant's contention that it was the duty of the trustees,
where two interpretations were available, to adopt the one which would
favor the participants, under a duty of "fair representation." The court
acknowledged that it is a union's duty to fairly represent the interests
of all of the members of the bargaining unit. However, it said:
Even though the fund here resulted from bargaining between
the employers and the union, we believe that the traditional duty
owed by a union to its members is not applicable. Rather, the
trustees' duties are those of fiduciaries because as trustees they
perform a separate function and do not act as representatives of
either the employers or the union.'26
In the New York case of Kristt v. Whelan,"2 7 a trust amendment
provided for forfeiture of benefits if an employee worked for a com-
petitor. The trustees interpreted this so as to divest an employee who
had resigned and went to work for a competitor six years after the
amendment. They deprived the employee of all of his interest in the
plan - including that portion which accrued prior to adoption of the
amendment. This was done despite language in the trust indenture
permitting amendment if it did not operate to divest any beneficiary
of his interest in the trust fund. The dissent argued for a more restric-
tive reading of the amendment so as to preserve that portion of the
employee's interest in the plan at the date of amendment. 128 But the
difference of opinion within the court, one commentator suggests, was
"only as how to interpret the language of the amendment clause,
not with the principle that the amendment power could be unfettered
if plainly stated."'2 9
126. 387 F.2d at 865 n.5. Cf. Smith v. D.C.A. Food Industries, Inc., 269 F. Supp.
863 (D. Md. 1967), in which the court, on the defendant's motion to dismiss, denied
the motion and held that it had jurisdiction, and that the complaint stated a cause of
motion and held that it had jurisdiction, and that the complaint stated a cause of
action which is cognizable under both the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,
§ 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1964). The court also noted that in the complaint:
[I]t is alleged that plaintiffs have been discriminated against and arbitrarily,
illegally and unfairly deprived of their rights. It would appear that these allega-
tions charge a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation and also allege
that DCA has wrongfully deprived plaintiffs of valuable rights to which they are
entitled under the pension fund.
The views expressed by the Supreme Court [in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335 (1964)] clearly establish that the action herein involves rights and obligations
which may be litigated by the plaintiff-employees under the aegis of section 301.
Id. at 869.
127. 4 App. Div. 2d 195, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239, aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 807, 181 N.Y.S.2d
205 (1957).
128. 4 App. Div. 2d at 199, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
129. J. CooK, Amendment of Labor Management Trust Agreements and Benefit
Plans - The Concept of Due Process, 1967 TEXTBOOK, supra note 5, at 453, 454.
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In Roark v. Lewis,5 0 the trust agreement conferred full authority
on the trustees on all questions of eligibility and coverage. The court
considered what, if any, limits were placed on the trustees. The case
involved the amendment of eligibility requirements and the court re-
fused to rule on the validity of the eligibility requirements on the record
before it. The court remanded, stating that:
Basically it is the responsibility of the parties and Congress
to determine the appropriateness of the pension plans with the
court's participation limited to affirmative action only in those
cases where the eligibility requirements are so patently arbitrary
and unreasonable as to lack foundation in factual basis and/or
authority governing case or statute law. We suggest therefore
that in the remand hearing the record be enlarged with sufficient
detail to permit us to measure the trustees' action against existing
standards of arbitrary and capricious conduct. 8"
Kosty v. Lewis,18 2 was still another United Mine Workers retire-
ment fund case. There, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court, allowing the retiree to qualify for his pension,
despite an amended eligibility rule which precluded his qualification,
on the ground that there is a duty on the part of the trustees to dis-
charge their duties in adherence to a concept of procedural due
process - meaning in the instant case, an amendment of the eligibility
rules must be made with notice to those affected by it.'8 '
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
It is now apparent that there are many situations where people
are unjustly deprived of pension benefits. Action should be taken to
rectify this situation. Considerable controversy may arise over the
definition of "unjust." Obviously, different people will have differing
opinions on this issue. Our purpose is to set forth our suggestions
130. 401 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
131. Id. at 428-29. In Collins v. U.M.W. Welfare and Retirement Fund, 298 F.
Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1969), Judge Holtzoff held that the court had authority to set aside
and declare invalid qualifications for pension eligibility that were arbitrary and
capricious. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a pension and so ordered.
132. 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964).
133. See also Sturgill v. Lewis, 372 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which the court
set out the "elemental requirements of fairness" for all proceedings before the trustees
in which they determine an applicant's eligibility for benefits under the pension trust
fund: (1) in a contested matter there must be a hearing; (2) the applicant must be
confronted with the evidence contrary to him; (3) he must be given the opportunity
of presenting evidence in his own behalf; (4) he must be given notice of the hearing;
and (5) the findings and conclusions of the trustees must be supported by substantial
evidence, with a reviewable record.
For cases which develop the due process argument, see Gomez v. Lewis, 414
F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1969) ; Branch v. White, 99 N.J. Super. 295, 239 A.2d 665 (1968) ;
see also Gediman v. Anheuser Busch, 299 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Moch v. Durkin,
297 N.Y.S.2d 865, 5 N.B.P.C. 46 (1969).
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for reforms. That others agree with these suggestions is not as im-
portant as that they are stimulated to recognize the problem, consider
and debate it, and eventually to solve it.
A. Introduction
It is essential to accept the principle that within the framework of
economic, political, and social realities we often try to achieve what is
possible. The ideal might indeed be better than "the best under the
circumstances." However, it is often not a choice between the latter
and the former, but the latter and nothing at all. The ideal pension
with respect to amount and security is, given today's economic facts,
not probably attainable. The stark reality is that there is not enough
treasure to obtain all goals, nor, indeed, a desire by many to do so.
The ideal pension plan would combine total portability with maxi-
mum benefits for all at retirement, plus provisions for early retirement,
disability retirement, and payments to survivors in the event of the
participant's death. To say that the cost of such a plan would be pro-
hibitive may not be accurate without the addition of the key word,
"today." Fifty years ago if someone had envisaged the private pension
system of 1970 he would have been deemed a visionary, and told that
the economy could not support such largess. Plans in terms of con-
tributions made, assets held, participants covered, and benefits paid
have grown tremendously in the past 20 years."" There is no doubt
that they will continue to grow, and indeed, develop at an accelerating
pace.'" 5 In the future, it is possible that contributions to plans will
provide maximum security. It is also possible, as some wish, some
fear, and still others predict, that the private pension system will be
absorbed by the Social Security program and that this goal will be
achieved.'86 At the present time we are still far from achieving the
aim of the perfect pension. The amount of pension alone, in many
cases, is not adequate to support people in their old age. Some pen-
sions still are in the area of twenty to forty dollars a month and a
great number are under one hundred dollars a month. Obviously, they
are inadequate as total stipends even for subsistence living. Coupled
with Social Security, private savings, and part time work, where neces-
sary, pensions can eliminate the need for support by either family or
the government. Some pension plans are now at levels where, in com-
bination with Social Security, they provide for comfortable and inde-
134. See, e.g., Pension and Retirement Plans in the United States, PZNSION &
WiUYARS Nzws, Mar. 1969, at 2.
135. Levin, supra note 25, at 23.
136. See Levin, supra note 23, at 3.
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pendent retirement. The alternates to the private pension system are
penury, private charity, public welfare, or governmental take over.18
Pension plans today are based on the actuarial principle that con-
tributions will be made for all, but only some will ultimately receive
benefits. While maximum portability, early vesting and reciprocity on
the one hand and high pension payments to retirees on the other hand
are both desirable goals, they are in direct conflict in a pension system
where the retirement benefit of one person is based on the fact that
another will never retire at all. Some plans have no severance benefits
and no meaningful vesting. This is by design and not an oversight.
It is only through the deprivation of one participant that the plan can
afford to pay another.
B. Review of Present Substantive Law:
Theories of Recovery
Employees who are deprived of their expected pension benefits
seek remedies in courts. The litigated cases are generally based on
three theories of recovery. First, it is possible for the employees to
obtain a judicial declaration that the plan has terminated,"' in whole
or in part, vesting all credits accrued by the employees. Second, there
is the theory that pensions are a form of deferred compensation, and
that the forfeiture of accrued credits to the benefit of others con-
stitutes unjust enrichment. This, if accepted, leads to the principle
that the employee has a right of recovery based on a quasi-contract or
a quantum meruit theory. Third, it is argued that the trustees (of a
joint labor-management plan at least) have a duty of fair representa-
137. In the health and welfare area of fringe benefits, similar problems of disloca-
tion and loss of benefit do not arise as frequently as in the pension field. This is
primarily because health and welfare benefits are "pay-as-you-go" whereas pensions
are based on present payments for future benefits. Nevertheless parallel problems may
arise. Consider two examples: (1) Company A buys company B and the B employees
leave to work in A's facility and join A's union. As a general rule maternity benefits
do not become effective until after nine months have passed from the first date of
coverage. Thus, any woman workers at company B who were covered under its plan
and pregnant at the time of the A-B transaction might not be covered for the delivery
of the child when they work at company A. Their hospital and medical protection
and years of service at B are, consequently, of little value at a time when they need it.
(2) A man who may have worked at B for 20 years moves over to work at com-
pany A. He is technically a new employee and, as such, must undergo a waiting
period before he is covered. Moreover, under some conditions, his insurance might
exempt any previous medical condition from coverage. He may require surgery or
hospitalization just when the individual program does not pay for it.
Although it is not within the scope of this Article, it is suggested that parallel
protection be afforded to groups of employees who, due to change of circumstances,
lose their welfare coverage and benefits. The solutions and recommendations set forth
in this Article could be applied with mere technical modification to both procedural
and substantive problems ensuing from similar situations with respect to other em-
ployee benefits.
138. See note 90 supra.
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tion toward the employees. This duty must be manifested in their
actions in the face of sale, dissolution, or merger of the enterprise.
1. Plan Termination: Vesting Credits
Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp.'8 9 amplifies the first approach
toward the disposition of retirement benefits when there are large
scale employee separations due to business dissolution or plant shut-
down. Consolidated Foods purchased the remaining operations of the
Griggs Co. in May 1953, and began major lay-offs almost immedi-
ately thereafter. By late 1955, there were only seventy-five former
Griggs employees left on the Consolidated payroll. (There were 580
at the time of acquisition). Consolidated continued the retirement plan
for the forty-two employees of seventy-five on the payroll who were
participants.
The appellate court reversed a lower court holding that was in
favor of the discharged employees. It declined to rule, as requested by
the plaintiffs, that the plan had terminated. Consolidated, said the
court, had continued the plan in force for the remaining Griggs em-
ployees (who were but seven percent of the original number) who
participated, and furthermore none of the conditions for termination
expressly set out in the plan had as yet occurred. 4' The court noted
the plan's ten-year vesting provision and from this, it inferred that
vested rights were not intended for any separated employee with less
than the required ten years of service. In fact, none of the plaintiffs
had this much service.
The court's decision created a "windfall" of some $170,000... in
"returns applied,' ' 42 accruing to the benefit of Consolidated which
139. 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772 (1958).
140. Id. at 379, 91 N.W.2d at 775.
141. The discharge between 1953 (the year of acquisition) and 1955 of 85 percent
of the former Griggs employees resulted in the transfer of the value of paid-up
annuities purchased on behalf of the separated employees to the premium account of
Consolidated as follows:
Total Payments
Due From Net Amount
Employee Employer To Returns Due From
Year Payments Insurer Applied Employer
1951 $23,499.08 $117,185.54 $ 9,197.89 $107,987.65
1952 23,830.20 106,338.54 2,641.31 103,697.83
1953 22,504.90 123,975.16 53,131.74 70,843.42
1954 11,785.40 45,697.98 46,247.78 (549.80)
1955 5,868.90 23,698.49 19,579.31 4,119.18
Record, at 151-53, Exhibit F, Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91
N.W.2d 772 (1958). The figures for 1951-1952 are included by way of comparison.
See also Bernstein, supra note 90, at 955 n.12.
142. The transfer of the value of the paid up annuities purchased by Consolidated's
predecessor on behalf of the separated employees to Consolidated's premium account
for the 42 former Grigg employees continued in service. 37
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had not made any of the contributions; there was no benefit to the
remaining participants, all of whom still had to meet the vesting and
retirement requirements. Had the court declared the plan terminated,
the former employees would have been granted vested rights to the
paid-up units of the annuity plan. As decided they received no relief.
In Bailey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle Co., 4 ' a New York court
turned back a similar employee challenge based on a termination theory.
The retirement annuity plan provided that discontinuance of contri-
butions by the employer would terminate the plan. The company
closed down one of its seventeen plants, continuing the operations and
the retirement plan coverage at the other sixteen facilities. The sepa-
rated employees at the closed plant who had been covered by the plan
brought an action for a judicial declaration that, as to them, the plan
was terminated because the employer no longer made contributions on
their behalf. The court rejected the employees' reading of the plan,
holding that discontinuance meant non-payment of contributions for
all employees. Again, as in Gorr, the practical result of the forfeiture
of non-vested interests in the plan was a gain for the employer - this
time in the amount of $256,0001" to apply against future premiums.
In still other cases, employees attempted to secure a judicial de-
termination that closing of a plant or discontinuation of a division
constituted, at least with respect to the severed employees, a termina-
tion of a retirement plan but they failed. In the early case of Longhine
v. Bilson,45 the New York Supreme Court (Niagara County) held
that a provision in the retirement plan calling for forfeiture of all
rights in the plan upon discharge from the employer's service did not
contemplate mass separations, and hence, was inapplicable in the case
of a plant shutdown. But Longhine was not followed by the New
York courts. 4 One court subsequently held that a plan was not
terminated where discontinuation of a division resulted in a discharge
of 1.6 percent of its employees because the participants' sole interest
was their contingent right to receive a pension at age sixty-five and
to a share of the trust fund if the plan is terminated.'47 It was later
held that if the plan is continued for other segments of the organi-
zation, the employees of the closed-down division were in no different
position than if they had severed their connection with the employer
for reasons other than the sale.'48 In George v. Haber,4 ' a Michigan
143. 13 Misc. 2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
144. M. BRxsTZiN, supra note 5, at 342 n.ll.
145. 159 Misc. 111, 287 N.Y.S. 281 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
146. See Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958).
147. Id.
148. Fernekes v. C.M.P. Indus., Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 217, 195 N.E.2d 884, 246 N.Y.S.2d
201 (1963), reversing, 15 App. Div. 2d 128, 222 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1961).
149. 343 Mich. 218, 72 N.W.2d 121 (1955).
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case arising out of Kaiser-Frazer's decision to withdraw from auto-
making, the workers attempted to have the court declare an entire plan
terminated. If successful, there would follow vesting of all interests
in the plan where the company separated 95 percent of its 11,000
employees. Again, the court refused to intercede. It noted that the
express purpose of the fund was to pay pension and disability benefits.
It found that the monies in the plan could not be diverted from that
intended use, despite what the plaintiffs (some 1,100 former Kaiser-
Frazer employees) pointed out; namely, that the changed circum-
stances were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time
they concluded the agreement. The court, declining to order a distri-
bution of the non-vested accrued credits, also noted that the agreement
specifically stated that the employer's contributions to the fund did not
constitute wages, salary, or compensation to any individual employee.
Moreover, 450 employees remained at work with the company, and
neither the union nor the employer had declared the plan terminated.' 50
In the face of overwhelming judicial opinion that large-scale dis-
charges as a consequence of plant sale or closing will not terminate
a retirement plan which continues elsewhere in the organization, the
plaintiffs in Machinists Local 2040 v. Servel, Inc.,' did not seek a
judicial declaration of termination. They had been discharged by the
company when it shut-down a large plant prior to its sale. Conse-
quently, they claimed that they should be accorded the status of laid-off
employees. Under provisions of the prevailing collective bargaining
agreement, this would have permitted them seniority rights for recall
of up to two years duration during which period they would have
acquired vested rights in the retirement plan. The court refused to
adopt the employees' argument that they were still employees, uphold-
ing instead the employer's right to discharge his workers for economic
reasons.15 A similar argument was made in Massachusetts, in Karcy
v. Luther Mfg. Co.'58 There the employer shut down the plant, dis-
charging the plaintiffs a short time prior to the date they would have
reached retirement age. The employees argued that they had been dis-
charged without cause, but their argument was unavailing.
150. The company ceased all operations and terminated all of its employees soon
after the litigation.
151. 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
152. The plaintiffs had argued that they had not been discharged for cause, as
required by the collective bargaining agreement, and that they must therefore be con-
sidered employees in a lay-off status. The courts have traditionally upheld an em-
ployers right to discharge his employees for economic reasons regardless of their
proximity to vesting their pension rights. See Wallace v. Northern Ohio Traction &
Light Co., 57 Ohio App. 203, 13 N.E.2d 139 (1937).
153. 338 Mass. 313, 155 N.E.2d 441 (1959).
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2. Unjust Enrichment: Quasi-Contractual Theories
In Lucas v. Seagrave Corp.,'54 the defendant corporation pur-
chased a plant from the Hupp Corp., taking as a part of the transaction
an assignment of Hupp's interest in a non-contributory annuity insur-
ance plan. In a very short period of time, Seagrave discharged thirty
of the plant's sixty-five employees, many of whom had long service
with the predecessor corporation. Seagrave used the forfeited benefits
of the separated employees to reduce its contribution liability for the
remaining covered employees. In fact, Seagrave paid no further monies
into the plan.
The plaintiff-employees alleged that the discharges were not to be
considered individual separations for economic reasons, but were mass
terminations15 pursuant to the employer's plan to use fund monies to
reduce his future premium liability. The plaintiffs further alleged that
they had a right of recovery for the value of that part of their services
for which the employer's contributions to the annuity plan were con-
sidered compensation. The defendants' 56 were unjustly enriched, the
employees claimed, by the amount of forfeited contributions which
they were able to apply in satisfaction of the liability for future con-
tributions on behalf of the remaining thirty-five employees.
"In other words, the plaintiffs asserted rights arising from law,
and not from the annuity contract or from the contract of employ-
ment."' 57 The court recognized that the pleadings in the instant case
clearly distinguished it from earlier cases which had almost universally
denied the discharged employees recovery on any "termination of
plan" theory'1 8 and denied the defendants motion for summary judg-
ment. In considering the compensatory nature of pension plans, the
court cited the decision in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 9 in which it
was concluded that pension costs are a part of the wage and fringe
package, are calculated as employment costs and are frequently substi-
154. 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
155. There was also concurrent economic pressure on the employees to retire.
156. In addition to Seagrave, the predecessor Hupp Corporation, the insurer and
Great Western Life Assurance Company, were joined as defendants.
157. D. JONSON, supra note 1, at 336. The traditional view is stated in Riley v.
Walker Bros., 425 Pa. 1, 229 A.2d 457 (1967). The employer closed down a portion
of its business and the management and union amended the pension plan to revise the
eligibility rules. The plaintiffs, a group of former employees, contended that the
revised rules were unfair and inequitable. The court enforced the amendment as
written. The court said its power with regard to pension plans is circumscribed; it
does not have the power to re-write or amend plans according to its own ideas of
fairness or equity.
158. See notes 139-50 supra and accompanying text.
159. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
[VOL. 15 : p. 527
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/1
Loss OF PENSION BENEFITS
tuted for direct cash.' 6° Lucas thus adopted the view that the annuity
benefits were indeed additional compensation embodied in a formal
plan. It is true that the employees assumed the risk of forfeiture as
a consequence of discharge prior to retirement. 6 ' However, while a
normal and actuarially determinable rate of turnover was contemplated,
the plan made no provision for mass discharges. Under the circum-
stances of a group separation a rigid application of trust indenture
provisions would defeat the compensatory intent of the plan. The
penalty for failure to meet the requirements for receiving benefits
would have fallen upon the employees. Moreover, their inability to
qualify was involuntary, caused solely, strictly, and unilaterally by
the employer's action. It was deemed inequitable for the employees
to have to bear this burden, particularly since loss of retirement benefit
was equated with deprivation of compensation already earned, i.e.,
worked for. A further equitable consideration was that such a loss
could be caused by an employer's termination of an entire group which
would serve to unjustly enrich the company by reducing its future
premium liability.'62
The court refused to grant summary judgment to plaintiffs,
although it recognized that, on the facts, a recovery in quasi-contract
160. Even modern courts reiterate this theory. See, e.g., Dorward v. I.L.W.U.-
PMA Pension Plan, --- Wash. _, 452 P.2d 258 (1969). But other courts permit
changes in eligibility requirements which deprive participants of benefits. See, e.g.,
notes 121-27 supra and accompanying text.
161. The plan did not provide for the vesting of rights prior to the employees
retirement. The first of the plaintiffs' allegations was that a group separation or
discharge had taken place, (thirty of sixty-five employees fired within the first year
after acquisition by Seagrave) which constituted partial termination of the plan. The
plaintiffs ingeniously based their claim on the fact that the plan was qualified under
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which requires for qualification
vesting of benefits in the event of termination, that the dischargees had in fact been
on an individual basis, and that the plan continued in operation for the remaining Hupp
employees. The defendants moved for summary judgment for the plaintiffs' failure to
state a valid claim. The court stated that the failure of the plan to provide for
vesting, even if the plan had in fact been partially terminated by the employee separa-
tions, affected only its tax status under the Code. But the Court, absent express
language in the plan of an intention to use the provisions of the Code to define or
interpret the terms of the contract, would not act to vest employee benefits in the
face of unambiguous language that the plan of termination of employment prior to
retirement worked a forfeiture of all rights under the plan. See also Dierks v.
Thompson, --- F.2d ____ (3d Cir. 1969). Textron, Inc., had an employee financed
pension trust. In 1963, it sold assets of one of its divisions, Armerotron, and the
employees became employees of the purchaser. These employees thereupon sued to
have their interests in the pension trust fund segregated from other fund interests
and calculated under an article providing that percentage interest in the fund would
vary in size depending on market value of the fund's total assets rather than under an
article providing for a fixed amount determined at time of termination of employment,
where percentage interest provision applied only to employees of company and sub-
sidiaries, not division. The court stated that Textron always construed a "Division"
not to be an "employer" and since the plan was freely amendable under its terms, this
meant that until the beneficiary's rights became vested by termination of his employ-
ment he could be deprived of future increases in benefits by unilateral act of Textron.
162. The amounts of such "windfall" reductions in future contribution liability are
not insubstantial. In Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772(1958), they amounted to over $170,000. See Table supra note 142. In Bailey v.
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was possible. A trial was held necessary to determine whether the
discharges had been on a group basis with the specific intent of defeat-
ing the employees' benefit expectations, as the plaintiffs contended, or
if the terminations had been made on an individual basis. Furthermore,
the court desired additional evidence to determine the extent to which
the parties had considered the annuity plan a form of compensation.
The unjust enrichment theory of recovery advanced by the plain-
tiffs in the Lucas case was tested the next year in Sbrogna v. Worcester
Stamped Metal Co.,'68 where a group of employees struck the company,
and were replaced. The company's retirement annuity plan was in many
respects similar to the plan in Lucas: there was no provision for vested
rights prior to retirement, and forfeitures were required to be credited
to the employer's account to reduce its liability for future contributions.
When the employees were terminated, the employer informed them
that their rights under the plan were also terminated and the plan was
continued for their newly hired replacements. The former workers
sued and the case was dismissed in the trial court. On appeal, the
plaintiffs sought recourse on the theories of breach of fiduciary duty
and unjust enrichment. First, plaintiffs claimed that the employer had
a fiduciary duty to the workers, and pursuant to it, was bound to termi-
nate the plan prior to separating the employees, thus preserving their
paid-up benefits which had accrued to date. The court disallowed this
argument, finding that the relationship between the employer and its
workers was of a business rather than fiduciary nature. The employer,
it concluded, was therefore under no obligation to preserve the benefit
rights of the striking employees, whose employment it terminated.
The plaintiffs second argument hinged on the plan's language,
which enabled the employer to use the amount of the plaintiffs for-
feitures to reduce its future liability for contributions on behalf of the
new employees. Such use, plaintiffs argued, constituted unjust enrich-
ment of the employer. The court rejected this contention. Its reason-
ing was that the employer was not unjustly enriched since it did not
retain the forfeited benefits and had merely followed the contractural
provision regarding the disposition of forfeitures.
Sbrogna thus falls within the scope of traditional judicial analysis
of employee pension rights in the face of mass termination. The court
did not explore the employees' rights in terms of the pension being de-
ferred compensation - a payment earned in lieu of wages - nor did it
consider that the employees served their employer and, as such, acted in
reliance that they would receive a pension after completing such service.
Rockwell Spring & Axle Co., 13 Misc. 2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1958), they
amounted to some $256,000.
163. 354 Mass. 17, 234 N.E.2d 749 (1968).
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It is submitted that the decision of the court in Sbrogna is in line
with the weight of precedent, the law as it now exists, and a narrow
reading of the contract and trust document. The court opened no new
frontiers. The outcome, however, would treat the plaintiffs inequitably.
To say that the employer was not unjustly enriched because it did not
get back the forfeited money is unrealistic. The forfeited money could
be used to reduced future obligations. Money is entirely fungible.
There is, consequently, a distinction without a difference. The com-
pany gains in the very direct sense that over the years its overall cost
for pensions will be less than if no forfeiture occurred.
Moreover, to merely follow the contract or trust provisions is
totally inadequate when a group of employees, as opposed to individ-
uals, are terminated. For a court to consider the difference only quan-
titative rather than qualitative, serves but to perpetuate the inequity.
If the courts feel, as this one did, that they cannot blaze new trails
and apply equitable remedies based on an unjust enrichment theory,
legislation will be necessary to empower them to do this. A key
problem, as the law currently exists, is that courts in some jurisdic-
tions may refuse to innovate and will construe strictly the terms of an
agreement while others, with a broader view, will fashion equitable
remedies. Thus, a pensioner's rights would be affected depending on
the forum where the action is brought.
The Lucas approach differs from the conventional analysis prin-
cipally in the court's willingness to look beyond the boundaries of the
pension plan, and to investigate the fundamental nature of the plan,
the expectations of the parties, and the social and economic context
of the problem. The group dicharges encountered in Lucas, Sbrogna,
Gorr and Servel, were probably not within the contemplation of the
parties when the plan was drawn nor could the actuaries have for-
seen these and made provision for this. Under the Lucas rationale,
when such situations arise the equities should favor the employees for
whom the pension plan represented a deferred wage, rather than the
employer who received a windfall enrichment. As noted, the distinc-
tion between return of forfeitures to employers and application of them
against future contribution obligations is a specious one.
It is important to note that Lucas involved a benefit plan adminis-
tered by an employer and not a jointly trusteed plan set up pursuant
to Taft-Hartley. The issue of unjust enrichment or employer wind-
fall will not arise under a joint plan where the employers' contributions
are set by the collective bargaining agreement and forfeitures remain
in the fund for the benefit of those employees who ultimately qualify
for retirement. In these situations the forfeitures may be applied to
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increase benefit levels. In Taft-Hartley plans where end benefits,
rather than contributions are negotiated, and the contributing em-
ployers must make payments sufficient to support the benefit, the Lucas
situation would apply. Similarly, in plans that are employer financed,
whether or not as a consequence of collective bargaining, forfeitures
would decrease the employer's liability to contribute and the Lucas
logic would apply.
The court in Lucas relied, to a considerable extent, on the absence
of any vesting provisions under the Seagrave plan. Jointly administered
funds, in many cases, do provide for vesting as do two major proposed
acts for regulation of pension plans, i.e., Senator Javits' and Repre-
sentative Dent's bills. Courts may react differently when there is vest-
ing and some employees will gain indirectly by the loss of fellow
workers who were terminated. Another problem in applying the Lucas
rationale to Taft-Hartley plans is the section 302 requirement that
the monies be held in trust for the exclusive purpose of paying benefits
to covered employees and their dependents. This requirement would
certainly inhibit trustees who wished to credit non-vested contributions
to employees who have not met eligibility requirements and who, be-
cause of termination would probably never qualify. A liberal or equi-
table interpretation by these trustees might violate the trust indenture
and consequently the federal law.
3. The Trustees' Duty of Fair Representation
Much of the litigation involving employee pension rights in the
event of plant closures, sale, or discontinuation of an operating division
occurred prior to the 1960's. In that decade the United States Supreme
Court enunciated its conviction that an individual employee or group
of employees had a right to bring suit under section 301 (a) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,"' against the union which
represents them, predicated upon an alleged violation by the union of
its duty of fair representation.' 65 Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc.,'66
concerns this aspect of the duty of fiduciaries towards employee par-
ticipants in a negotiated joint pension plan."' In mid-1966 the em-
ployees of the Cereal Division of DCA were advised that the division
would be closed during the first half of 1967 and that the employment
164. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
165. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) ; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
reh. denied, 376 U.S. 935 (1964).
166. 269 F. Supp. 863 (D. Md. 1967).
167. Cf. Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Hauser v. Farwell,
Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 299 F. Supp. 387 (D. Minn. 1969). In Hauser, the court refused
to allow a distribution it considered inequitable. It held that the union could not bar-
gain away employees' rights, citing Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711
(1945) and 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
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of the workers in that division would be terminated at that time. The
union met with the employer in late 1966 and amended the pension trust
agreement, providing that the only employees of the discontinued divis-
ion who would retain eligibility for pension benefits at age sixty-five
would be those who met certain criteria of age and years of service. As
a corollary, the rest of the employees would lose all rights to a pension.
The plaintiffs sought a judicial ruling that the amendments to the plan
were null and void and also requested a declaration of their rights in and
to the fund. They based their case on the following contentions:
(a) The amendment frustrated the union's reasons and pur-
poses in originally negotiating the plan in 1953.
(b) The amendment discriminated in favor of the personnel
of the Mechanical Division (which continued in opera-
tion and under plan coverage) as well as in favor of
some of the Cereal Division's older employees.
(c) The amendment arbitrarily, illegally, and unfairly de-
prived the plaintiffs of their rights in and to the fund.
(d) DCA's contributions to the retirement fund constituted
a part of the plaintiffs' compensation from the time the
plan was established in 1953 and the amendment deprived
the plaintiffs of that compensation.
The action was brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act 6 " and
under section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. The defendants" 9
moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The court noted:
The Supreme Court has . . . made it clear that a breach of the
duty of fair representation which would entitle an employee to
maintain suit against a union under section 301 is not limited to
cases where the union is alleged to have acted fraudulently. Such
a breach occurs whenever a union acts arbitrarily, discriminatorily
or in bad faith with regard to a member of the collective bargain-
ing unit .... [I]n plaintiffs' complaint ... it is alleged that plain-
tiffs have been discriminated against and arbitrarily, illegally and
unfairly deprived of their rights. It would appear that these allega-
tions charged a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation
and also allege that DCA has wrongfully deprived plaintiffs of
valuable rights to which they are entitled under the pension fund.
.. . The shutdown in this case of one division (the Cereal
Division) and continuance of another division (the Mechanical
Division) and the fact that the employees in both divisions are
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
169. The defendants joined were DCA Food Industries, Inc.; Local 13128,
U.M.W.; the United Mine Workers of America and the National Bank of Wash-
ington. By stipulation of all parties the bank did not participate in any of the hearings,
conferences or trials.
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represented by the same union presents a situation which is anal-
ogous in many ways to the situation in Humphrey [v. Moore].
Under such circumstances the employer and the Union may well
have been prone to act, and indeed might have acted, unfairly
towards the employees being laid off and to have discriminatorily
favored the employees whose employment continues. The need to
permit employees who are being laid off and who level such
charges at both the Union and DCA to proceed under section 301
is self-evident.1 7 0
Those who saw the DCA case as a break-through to an equitable
solution of the problem were soon to be disappointed. On April 23,
1968 the court, having found no genuine issue of material fact, held
that no contractual, quasi-contractual, statutory or other rights of the
plaintiffs had been violated by the defendants. Accordingly, the defend-
ants' motions for summary judgment were granted."'
C. Recommendations Regarding Substantive Law
In conclusion, a review of prevailing substantive law indicates
that when a large group of employees have their employment termi-
nated, the courts will not favor their claims to an interest in the
monies which have been set aside for their ultimate pension. This
applies equally to funds provided solely by employers and to those
administered jointly by labor and management. The courts strictly in-
terpret the trust indenture, are reluctant to apply concepts of equitable
relief and to disregard the technical document wording and base their
decisions on such theories as quantum meruit, unjust enrichment or
failure of representation. From this we may project with a reasonable
degree of certainty, that if employee deprivation of pension benefits
comes about through their own actions, e.g., by decertification, schism,
disaffiliation, etc., that the courts certainly would not be more sym-
pathetic to their pleas. The prevailing judicial rationale would apply
in both kinds of situations, perhaps with even more justification in
the latter.
Commentators can easily blame courts for failure to innovate.
But we must realize that there are reasons for the hesitation of courts
to legislate in this area. First, they are bound by precedent. Second,
judges do not wish to invite reversal by appellate courts. Third, the
bench is loathe to usurp the legislative prerogative. Fourth, the entire
training of judges and lawyers in our legal system is to make decisions
based on the facts, particularly those embodied in formal written agree-
170. 269 F. Supp. at 869-70.
171. Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc., Civil No. 18,237 (D. Md., filed Apr.
?3, 1968).
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ments and not to overturn such documents simply because they think
that to do so would produce a more just result.
As a result, to criticize courts for a failure to meet all the needs
of those who are disenfranchised may be fruitless and must predicate
an adoption of a judicial philosophy not universally espoused. And
to hope they will do this sua sponte is probably futile. What the courts
must have to enable them to act in this field is direction from the
legislative branch of government. Therefore, it is recommended that
there be an affirmation by the Congress that equitable principles may
be applied in such cases. This would free the courts and permit them
to apply equitable remedies. The time for such legislation is now,
when this entire field of regulation of pension plans is under scrutiny.
The vehicle could be independent legislation or an amendment to cur-
rently proposed pension regulation laws. In essence such a provision
should read:
In the event of a group leaving a pension or welfare plan
enjoying tax-exempt status, if such departure was not actuarially
anticipated, provisions may be made to protect the rights of non-
vested participants so as to avoid unjust enrichment to others -
fellow employees or employers - and so as to preclude unjust
deprivations of these people. Such provisions should be in accord-
ance with established principles of equity.
The wording is purposely loose so as to allow judges to fashion
a remedy on an ad hoc basis and so as to permit the parties the widest
latitude in endeavoring to determine, with the aid of actuaries, if the
partitioning of assets from a plan, or the ordered termination of part
of a plan, would actuarially do damage to the remaining employees
who must also be protected.
D. Alternative Forums for Relief - Recommendations
for Legislative and Judicial Change
Heretofore most litigation concerning the rights of employees in
benefit plans has arisen in state courts, although in some cases federal
courts have asserted jurisdiction. Most of the plans involved have been
non-negotiated or management-run plans. One key question just dis-
cussed is how to decide pension plan cases. Another, of equal import-
ance, is where to decide them.
Before relief may be obtained under substantive law there must
be a procedure to enable the grievant to find a forum with jurisdiction
to grant redress. Currently, there is some confusion as to what court,
agency or arbitrator has jurisdiction to determine a claim. There is
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often doubt as to where an aggrieved group of members can claim a
hearing. Several alternatives will be discussed here. These are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive and, as will be developed later, could supple-
ment each other. Let us consider where a grievance could be adjudicated
today, discuss the major alternatives and then examine suggestions.
1. Arbitration
First, arbitration could be employed to obtain fair results. It has
long been used with considerable success in collective bargaining
situations. Its techniques are certainly known to most labor people,
frequently including workers as well as leaders, and to management
representatives. The key advantages of arbitration - namely speed,
informality, and finality - would all apply with particular value here.
The American Arbitration Association recognized the unique
problems of joint labor-management pension and welfare funds and
realized that the skills needed for an arbitrator in this field are some-
what different from commercial or labor panel arbitrators. In 1966,
it established a panel to function exclusively in disputes involving
pension and welfare plans. This was done in conjunction with the
National Foundation of Health, Welfare and Pension Plans, Inc. This
author, formerly Chairman of the Foundation's Attorneys Committee
and one of its directors commented then;
[S]ettlement of disputes of joint fund trustees would, in many
cases, require specialized knowledge and particular procedures.
Neither the rules pertaining to commercial arbitration nor labor
arbitration seemed entirely fitted to solve the problem of disagree-
ments on joint boards. Moreover, it was felt that a special panel
of arbitrators was required. It was noted that extremely sophis-
ticated problems involving actuarial determinations, investment
policies, etc., could arise and that it would be most advantageous
to utilize arbitrators having technical competence in these areas
and also knowledge of the workings of joint trust fundsY.7 2
The clause recommended by the American Arbitration Association for
inclusion in joint trust indentures is as follows:
RECOMMENDED TRUST FUND CLAUSE
for Impartial Umpire Procedures:
In the event of a deadlock upon any question coming before
the Trustees for decision, the Trustees shall submit such a question
to an impartial Umpire who shall be appointed by and in accord-
172. Levin, Panel of Joint Trust Arbitrations Established by American Arbitration
Association, 3 NAT'L FouND. DIG4St 2 (1966).
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ance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The
decision of said Umpire shall be final, binding and conclusive upon
the Trustees and all parties concerned.
Either the Employer or Union Trustees may apply to the
American Arbitration Association Regional Office nearest to the
area in which the Fund maintains its principal office.
The cost and expense incurred in any proceedings which may
ensue, including the fee of the impartial Umpire and the American
Arbitration Association, shall be proper charges against the Fund
and the Trustees are authorized to pay such charges.'
Pursuant to section 302(c)(5)(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act all
joint labor-management pension and welfare funds must have an im-
partial party to break deadlocks among the trustees. The Act states
that "in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the
administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons em-
powered to break such deadlock ... the two groups shall agree on an
impartial umpire to decide such dispute . ,,."' However, this pro-
vision of the law does not provide for the situations discussed in this
article. The trustees may be in complete agreement, and in fact in
most cases they are, as, they were in the DCA Foods case, or the
Kaiser-Frazier shutdown case.' The challenge would be mounted by
participants in the plan who felt their interests damaged or destroyed
by the trustees' decisions. If fewer than one-half of the trustees advo-
cated their cause, under section 302 there would be no deadlock. As a
result there would be no opportunity to secure the appointment of an
impartial umpire. Even if one less than one-half of the trustees accepted
the dissidents' view this avenue of recourse would be defeated.
Assuming, arguendo, that the trustees of the joint fund did reach
a stalemate and resort to an impartial umpire to determine the rights
of the parties, that selection would not be made with the concurrence
or even consultation of the affected participants. Often the very rank
and file personnel who face the derogation of their rights under the
plan are the people who are not represented - and their claims may
be inarticulated and not presented. 176 Moreover, the participants' in-
terests may not coincide with those of the trustees, even when these
latter nominally represent the membership participants.
To facilitate arbitration of disputes and to open a road of recourse
for participants, the italicized provision below should be appended to
173. G. AKS4N, Arbitration of Disputes Arising From Health, Welfare and Pen-
sion Fund Plans, in 7 TEXTBOOK FOR WELFARE, PENSION TRUSTEES AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS 207, 214 (1965).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (b) (1964).
175. See notes 149-50 supra and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 863 (D. Md. 1967).
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section 401 of Senator Javits' proposed "Pension and Employee Benefit
Act" as follows:
SEc. 401. Every employees' benefit fund established to pro-
vide for the payment of benefits under an employees' benefit plan
shall be established pursuant to a duly executed trust agreement
which shall set forth the purpose for which such fund is estab-
lished and the detailed basis on which payments are to be made
into and out of such fund, and furthermore, if 10 percent of the
participants of the plan, or 25 participants, whichever is less, re-
quest an arbitration on a uniform issue or issues, then the trustees
must consent to such arbitration, and the trust agreement must
provide for same.
The figures chosen are necessarily arbitrary. The point is to
provide recourse to arbitration for groups of participants, while safe-
guarding the trustees from frivolous claims and the threat of unduly
vexatious and costly arbitrations. A percentage figure alone is unfair
since in a huge plan with 20,000 people even a figure of 5 percent
would require 1,000 people with the same problem. Many shops may
have less than this number and to impose a figure based on percentage
of the total would penalize the participants in large plans. On the other
hand, in a small plan with only 50 members, requiring 25 or more
would work a hardship and a percent would be more sensible. A flat
numerical requirement would penalize the participants in small funds.
The formula presented here is designed to give protection to the
greatest number. It is not unlike procedures designed for stockholders'
derivative actions in certain states.Y7 7 If subsequent developments dem-
onstrate that arbitration is capriciously resorted to and that the costs
prove to be too high to justify their purpose, the number or percentage
can be raised. Conversely, if it develops that participants are still un-
protected in groups, the requirements for arbitration can be lowered.
The suggested legislation purposely does not detail how each plan
must provide for arbitration, preferring to leave this up to the individual
plan. It is specifically stated in the proposed statute that the issue or
issues must be uniform, thus not opening the door for individual com-
plaints or allowing several pensioners or participants to group different
grievances together. The term "participants" as used should be defined
as covering (a) those for whom contributions have been made; (b)
those for whom contributions are made; (c) those receiving benefits;
and (d) dependents of the above three classes.
177. Cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1965), which sets out the
requirements in terms of a percentage of the outstanding shares (5 percent) or a fixed
amount ($50,000) for the maintenance of a shareholders' derivative action brought in
the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor.
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The purpose of the arbitration clause lies in the need for group
representation for participants whose benefit expectations are endan-
gered as a result of displacement of the entire group. The individual
participant who believes he is aggrieved may present his case to the
trustees. It generally will concern a question of eligibility. The board
of trustees' decision will be influenced by the requirement of adherence
to the concept of due process laid down in Kosty v. Lewis." 8 The
interests of an entire group whose rights may be annihilated, often to
the advantage of others,17 9 must be protected.
Incorporation of this suggested wording in a federal statute, be
it the Javits' bill or other pending legislation, or legislation introduced
for this sole purpose, would mean that in the event trustees did not
comply with the law, enforcement could be had through federal
channels. A model clause for inclusion in trust indentures, if this
federal law were passed would be:
If 10 percent or 25 of the participants, as defined herein, of
this plan, shall present a written instrument signed by such num-
ber to any trustee, that trustee shall so inform the presiding trustee
of the plan, who shall arrange a meeting with the signatories,
by meeting with the signatory designated, or in default of same,
with the first signatory on the list, for purposes of selecting an
arbitrator. If the parties cannot agree on the selection of an arbi-
trator they shall apply to the American Arbitration Association
for appointment of the same, (or the Federal District Judge where
the main office of the trust is located, or the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service). If the plan has no presiding trustee
the trustee upon whom the petition is served shall call a meeting
forthwith, for the purpose of apprising the other trustees of the
petition and arranging for the arbitration.
The arbitrator to whom the dispute is presented would then make
a determination of the right of the parties, vis-A-vis the trust, and in
terms of the substantive criteria discussed above. This decision would
be based on principles of equity. Let us consider an earlier example
in the light of the recommendations here. Plant A's workers are
transferred from union A to union B due to a merger of the plants.
There is no possible construction of the rules of the A pension plan
which could give them credit. However, that result is unfair. The
workers who transferred would petition for an arbitration. The arbi-
trator would be empowered to apply principles of equity and following
178. 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964); see notes
132-33 supra and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 863 (D. Md. 1967);
see notes 166-71 supra and accompanying text.
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that, might very likely apportion a part of the trust for the benefit of
the workers who were moving out from under coverage of the plan.
In addition to pension funds, plans set up to provide welfare
benefits, vacations, holidays, apprenticeship training, day-care centers
and scholarship funds would also be included. While the hardships
discussed would occur with greatest frequency in the pension area,
there is no need to limit coverage just to pension plans. The safe-
guards are palliative in nature and thus might be utilized with value
in the case of other plans. Arbitration procedures could be used in
connection with unilateral plans as well as joint trusts. The aggrieved
parties could call on the trustees for arbitration or demand it through
the American Arbitration Association.
2. The NLRB and Fair Representation Suits
A second avenue of relief would be upon application by the par-
ticipants to the NLRB to issue 8(b) (1) charges against the union on
the grounds of failure of proper representation. Miranda Fuel Co.'
and Local 12, United Rubber Workers,' suggest the manner in which
allegations of a failure by the collective bargaining representative to
represent fairly all members of the bargaining unit may be transformed
into unfair labor practice charges by an employee group. 8 2 This
emerging doctrine, which is in a sense the corollary of the Vaca v.
Sipes' ruling, is of some use in the grievance area. In fact it may
influence the union's bargaining posture in establishing a joint pension
trust fund in the first instance. However, there are questions as to
how far these doctrines will be implemented and what the consequences
for orderly labor-management relations would be if they were carried
to an extreme.
In many of the problem areas under discussion, this theory would
not apply. For example, workers who decertify a union and lose pension
benefits cannot very persuasively charge the union which they decertified
with not properly representing them after decertification." 4 The union
would have a substantially controlling defense, to wit: that since it no
longer represented the workers it had no duty to represent them. The
same analogy is true in the case of disaffiliation' and also a merger
of plants, where the old union no longer represents the workers. 8
180. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
181. 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967).
182. See Note, 44 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 855 (1969).
183. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
184. See notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 62-83 supra and accompanying text.
186. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
[VOL. 15 : p. 527
52
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/1
Loss OF PENSION BENEFITS
Resort to the NLRB on a failure of fair representation theory
raises the issue of the proper role of union trustees regarding member
participants. Joint trusts are unique in the trust field, deriving from
the congressional usage in section 302 of the 1947 Labor-Management
Relations Act.1 7 Nevertheless they are trusts, and the trustees, regard-
less of their constituency, are bound by the same standards of fiduciary
responsibility as trustees elsewhere in the law. 18
Only in some cases would this theory of recourse to the NLRB
be applicable. Where the trusts were not collectively bargained, if
union officers were not actively involved in administration or as
trustees, the doctrine of failure of representation might not apply.
Even where it did, more problems would be created by this theory
than would be solved. The NLRB might conceivably issue a directive
to the union trustees to act in a certain manner, i.e., do a certain thing.
The trustees as fiduciaries - not union officials - might believe that
complying would jeopardize their position as prudent men and might
refuse. This would engender further litigation. Even if the labor
trustees did follow the Board's directives, the management trustees
might refuse to do so. Consequently, a deadlock would be created and
the issue would go to an arbitrator in accordance with the trust agree-
ment. However, the arbitrator, after hearing the issue might render
a ruling which has the effect of telling one party to ignore an NLRB
directive; and if he deemed the NLRB ruling dispositive of the issue
or res judicata, he would be deciding without permitting the company
trustees any presentation of their view, since they would not have
been party to the earlier NLRB proceeding. Furthermore, if the board
of trustees followed the NLRB ruling they might expose themselves
to lawsuits from other participants, beneficiaries or employers who
would complain that their actions ran contrary to the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Acting in accordance with an arbitrator's decision
or even an NLRB ruling might not be an absolute defense to a suit
alleging breach of fiduciary obligations which arises in a state court
under a state's trust laws.
In effect a union trustee wears two hats. He is a union officer
representing membership and he is also a legal fiduciary. Where trus-
tees were faced with two alternative constructions of an eligibility
rule the court in Miniard v. Lewis..9 stated:
Even though the fund here resulted from bargaining between the
employers and the union, we believe that the traditional duty owed
by a union to its members is not applicable. Rather, the trustees'
187. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1964).
188. See Levin, supra note 25, at 23.
189. 387 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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duties are those of fiduciaries because as trustees they perform a
separate function and do not act as representatives of either the
employers or the union.'
One might argue that the unique nature of the Taft-Hartley joint
trust imposes a correspondingly unique duty on the trustees - that in
addition to adhering to the "prudent man" standard, they have an
obligation to protect the benefit expectation of all of the beneficiaries
as union members. But there is a conflict since generosity towards
eligibility requirements may be consistent with fair play, loyalty to
membership, effective representation, even political acumen and yet
violate the trust rules for preservation of the corpus.
In any event, Board proceedings, particularly in view of the exten-
sive appeals structure, could be lengthy. While NLRB proceedings
themselves are generally expeditiously handled, enforcement or appeal
proceedings in federal courts can often be delayed for long periods.''
During the interim, people might be deprived of welfare or pension
benefits. Also, people who were ready to retire might not be able to
do so. This would create uncertainty and instability for individuals
who would have to wait for a decision. Because of this time gap,
which could run several years, these people would be stymied in their
own personal planning. Financially, a heavy burden would be im-
posed on the individual workers. They might not have a union or
organization to support, direct or organize them. Funds may have
to come from their own pockets. Many would be reluctant to make
large outlays of cash and some might seek a free ride. Of course, if the
NLRB handled the case the government, not the individuals, would
bear the cost of the proceeding. Finally, it is important to note that
while delays and expenses could arise under almost any recommended
method, the advantage of arbitration is that the arbitrator can appor-
tion costs.
3. Courts - Development of Federal Common
Law in Regard to Pension Funds.
Either specific legislation or further court decisions might clearly
express the right to use the federal court system as the forum for
litigating pension problems. It may be presently argued that under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.. 2 actions concerning
190. Id. at 865 n.5.
191. An unfair labor practice charge is normally heard by a trial examiner of the
National Labor Relations Board. His decision may be appealed to the Board on
exceptions. The Board's ruling may be reviewed by a Circuit Court of Appeals on
a petition for review or on a petition for enforcement filed by the Board. See N.
LZVIN, SUCcESSFUL LABOR RELATIONS 192-202 (new rev. ed. 1967).
192. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
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joint Taft-Hartley trusts may be brought in federal courts. However,
this leaves out the very important area of non-Taft-Hartley plans and
particularly non-negotiated plans.
However, all funds - welfare or pension - really derive their
ability to grow from their tax exempt status. Therefore, based on
Taft-Hartley and/or applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code
it would be appropriate to clearly state that disputes concerning the
rights of the parties under employee benefit trusts, which have been
qualified for tax exemption, may be resolved in federal district courts.
In fact, there is currently legislation being considered which would
impose a federal fiduciary standard on trustees of employee benefit
trusts. This legislation would be the logical place to include the pro-
vision that litigation be in federal courts. If such a law setting federal
fiduciary standards is passed, then, in addition to the rationale for
federal court jurisdiction based on Taft-Hartley and/or tax qualifica-
tion, it could be based on the new federal fiduciary law. One com-
mentator has stated that:
A difficult and unanswered question is whether the substantial im-
provement in the rights of most beneficiaries is sufficient justifi-
cation for the impairment of the rights of some beneficiaries. The
answer to this question will lie, as will the answers to most
questions in this field, in the area of the developing federal law
of benefit funds.
Another undefined area is the appropriate forum for determi-
nation of trustees' responsibilities or beneficiaries' rights ...
[T]he better rule clearly is to apply that same evoluntionary
federal common law sanctioned as to Section 301 of the LMRA
in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills. 9 '
Two significant assumptions underlie the statement above: first, that
there is a developing federal law of benefit funds and second, that the
Lincoln Mills rationale should be extended to the joint trust area. As
the First Circuit stated with logic in Copra v. Suro :1"4
The legislative history suggests to some extent that . . .
Congress intended in Section 302(e) to create a broad equity
jurisdiction that would not only authorize the district courts to
forbid the making of payments in violation of Section 302(a)
and (b), but that would also authorize them to exercise a more
general equity power over the welfare funds whose life in effect
depends on the permissive exceptions of Section 302(c) (5).
Unfortunately to date there has really not been development of a
body of federal law; nor have "equity" principles been applied. Serious
193. P. THOMSON, 1967 TEXTBOOK, supra note 5, at 443 (citations omitted).
194. 236 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir. 1956) (dictum).
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consideration must be given the idea of a developing federal common
law of pension and welfare trust funds. It should not be limited only
to those funds which derive their very existence from the federal
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, although as the law pres-
ently stands it could be argued that there is more basis for including
these trusts than other non-Taft-Hartley employee benefit trusts.
Section 302 is not preemptive in its scope, and state courts are not
precluded from applying state law in their consideration of joint pen-
sion and welfare fund cases.' 95 The concurrent jurisdiction exercised
by the state courts, each interpreting rules or documents differently or
applying distinctive standards, precedents or principles of construction,
may lead to divergent results. This could occur even with respect to
the same fund, where the issue was litigated in several forums simul-
taneously. With the current trend toward fund consolidation, recipro-
city and portability of credits and the accelerated growth of industry
and nation-wide funds, it is entirely possible to find the trust office,
the trustees, the beneficiaries, and the contributing employers located
among several jurisdictions. The conventional arguments in favor of
uniformity of treatment, consistent legal application and predicta-
bility of result have substantial significance here. The joint fund is
a unique statutory creature and it is reasonable to argue that it merits
a unique and consistent treatment in the courts to effectuate the under-
lying congressional intent. Going even a step further it may be recog-
nized that employer contributions to all pension and welfare trusts
are substantially aided by tax exemption which is federal rather than
state insofar as its major impact is concerned. As a quid pro quo for
this preferred treatment Congress can rightfully require that federal
courts regulate these institutions which have received favored treatment.
Passage of a broadly applicable federal fiduciary statute will lend further
support to this position, and might, indeed, preempt the field.
The proposed legislation should specifically preempt the state courts
as forums for civil litigation over employee benefit fund problems. To
allow concurrent jurisdiction would foment conflict of law problems,
serve no useful purpose and result in divergent principles of law.
The only disadvantages of federal proceedings - namely the cost
of litigation, the task of organizing plaintiffs and the lengthy delays -
would not be mitigated if state jurisdiction was adopted. The new
administration bill, as noted later, establishes clearly and unquestion-
ably that federal jurisdiction may apply. It sets forth the conditions
under which suits may be commenced in federal court while not
specifically exempting state courts from concurrent jurisdiction.
195. See, e.g., Thacher v. United Construction Workers, 10 N.Y.2d 439, 180
N.E.2d 245, 224 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1962).
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4. Specialized Agency: The Javits Proposal
A fourth alternative is to set up a special agency having par-
ticular knowledge of employee benefits to deal with these problems.
Such a commission as Senator Javits recommends could handle prob-
lems arising in pension funds and other employee benefit trusts.
Hearing examiners could be appointed who would preside at hearings
which would involve the types of problems set forth here, and addi-
tionally other matters which would arise under the proposed law.
Even if the Javits Bill were not passed, a Commission for these
problems could be enfranchised. As with the NLRB and other alphabet
agencies, investigators would check first to see if, in fact, a bona fide
grievance existed under the terms of the law. Should these investi-
gators report that there is such a potential injustice as the law seeks
to avoid, then they could certify that a question arose under the Act.
Thereupon a hearing would be scheduled. The claimants would have
a right to present their case. The trustees would indicate their view-
point and the hearing examiner would ultimately render a ruling.
This decision or interim report would be passed up to the full board.
Acting on the facts and record adduced before the examiner the Com-
mission would either accept, reject or modify his report. As with
other agencies, provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act would
apply.' 9 ' Directives of the Commission would be enforceable if appli-
cation was made to a district court in the event a party refused to
abide by the decision. Appeal from the Commission could be made to
a court of appeals and ultimately the United States Supreme Court.
Federal appellate courts would acknowledge the particular expertise
of this administrative agency as they do with others. To this end the
Javits Bill establishes the United States Pension and Employee Benefit
Plan Commission. The Senator has stated that:
The Commission . . . would be an independent agency organized
on the SEC pattern. The language of section 3(a) is similar to
the language establishing the SEC. The general intent of the
bill is to centralize all federal regulation relating to employee
benefit plans in a single agency, thereby to the maximum feasible
extent relieving plan administrators of the burden of multiple-
agency regulation and avoiding the necessity of multiple applica-
tions, multiple inspections, and overlapping jurisdictions. 19 7
The Javits Bill extends broad powers to the Commission to regu-
late virtually all phases of employee benefit plans." Of particular
196. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1964).
197. 115 CoNrG. REc. 5194 (daily ed. May 14, 1969).
198. S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1969).
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interest is the fact that the Commission is empowered to sue to en-
force benefit standards'99 as well as the administration of funds pro-
visions of title IV.210 Section 504 of the Act preserves a private
remedy in the case of a violation of any provision of a plan. As to
forum and applicable law, the Senator states that:
The law applicable in any such case based upon a breach of con-
tract or breach of trust .. .would be State law in any case in
which the agreement designates the law of a state as applicable,
and in all other cases, federal common law would apply, although,
of course, the federal courts would be expected to draw upon
the State common law as a source for the development of a federal
common law in this area.2 0
1
Further, sections 502 and 504 of the proposed Act permit either the
Commission or an individual participant to bring suit either against
the fund to compel the payment of benefits, or in the name of the fund
"tagainst any person who shall have transferred or received any of the
assets of such fund in violation of any such agreement or of the re-
quirements of title IV."'212 This remedy is comparable to the familiar
stockholders derivative suit in corporation law.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, it is believed that the arbitration alternative is an
excellent one. It permits a speedy conclusion and apportionment of
costs. Legislation, as recommended herein, should be passed to en-
courage use of arbitration for all funds. Specific enabling legislation
allowing federal court jurisdiction would seem to be a particularly
sensible alternative. However, despite Senator Javits' view, it is be-
lieved that emphasis should be placed on the evolution of federal law
rather than on the application of state laws. The use of a specialized
agency might also provide an excellent avenue of relief for aggrieved
participants particularly when coupled with a right of litigation and
appeal within the federal court system.
It is imperative that steps be taken now to provide remedies and
a knowledgeable forum for the wronged, potentially wronged and those
who fancy they are wronged.
E. Proposed Federal Legislation
There is a wide divergence of opinion as to the necessity for or
desirability of federal legislation concerning private pension plans.20 '
199. S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1969).
200. S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1969).
201. 115 CoN. Rzc. 5186 (daily ed. May 14, 1969).
202. S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 504 (1969).
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One insurance company executive has labelled pending bills in Con-
gress as the "legislative shadow ' 2 °4 and concluded one presentation
to a pension group with the ominous prediction of envelopment of the
private sector unless they act. He said:
I hope this brief survey of the effect of legislation on benefit plan
levels has made you aware, if you were not before, of how the
legislative shadow over private pensions is lengthening. To the
extent we voluntarily undertake to enlarge and strengthen pen-
sion commitments to employees, the dimmer that shadow will
grow. There may be no light left if we fail.205
Another observer, in a presentation before a meeting of the
National Foundation of Health, Welfare & Pension Plans, Inc., com-
menced his remarks with these words:
I thought seriously about pinning a band of black crepe around
my sleeve before this session to dramatize a forthcoming death,
the imminence of which many of you may still be unaware - the
death of the private pension system in the United States of
America. . . .I would like to offer some insights into this bill
[S. 3421] which may lead you to conclude, as many have, that
this is the first bullet to be fired into the now healthy body of
the private pension system and which, if fired, will inevitably
result in the demise of the private pension system. °6
The sponsor of a bill viewed pension regulation legislation in a
somewhat less dramatic light. He stated that:
I do think there ought to be some minimum standards in this
field. And, in my judgment, those minimum standards will no
more force all pension plans to be the same than the minimum
wage law forces all employees' wages to be the same. The mini-
mum is merely the basic level which decency and order require.20 7
It is becoming increasingly apparent that there will be some legis-
lation considered in the next few sessions of Congress. Such legislation,
if enacted, could alleviate or eliminate some of the problems considered
in this article. The most significant bills that are presently contem-
plated would not solve many of the problems discussed here unless
amendments or additions are made to them. These could be either those
suggested here or others that would be responsive to the problems
203. See Levin, supra note 25, at 24.
204. A. Hess, The Legislative Shadow Lengthens, 1968 TXTBOOK, supra note 1,
at 410.
205. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
206. R. VAN DEURSN, Comments Regarding Proposed Federal Legislation Affect-
ing Qualified Employee Benefit Plans, 1968 TiXcTBOOK, supra note 1, at 234.
207. 115 CoNG. Rxc. 5196 (daily ed. May 14, 1969).
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discussed. Key among the present proposals for change are sections
dealing with vesting, funding, insurance, portability and fiduciary
responsibility. An examination of these proposed bills together with
an analysis of their utility in solving the problems discussed previously
is in order.
1. Vesting
Vesting provisions in pension plans assume critical importance
in many of the instances which we have discussed throughout this
article. Professor Bernstein has observed that:
Supposedly vesting is unnecessary when a company goes out of
business because the plan terminates, . . . thereby effecting vest-
ing of all credits without regard to length of service or age. How-
ever, as substantial separations usually will precede the actual
shutdown, only those who achieve the age and service require-
ments of a vesting provision will obtain benefit eligibility. And
usually the employees who can or do hold on to the bitter end
are the high seniority employees. If a plant shutdown is but one
unit of an enterprise, the plan usually will not terminate, and the
vesting eligibility conditions determine whether most or a sub-
stantial group of employees achieve or fail to attain eligibility.
20 8
One approach to the vesting problem, suggested in the Yarborough
act, is to reduce the overall age and service requirements, which this
bill accomplishes by requiring full vesting of regular retirement benefits
after an employee has acquired ten years of continuous service. A
second approach is characterized by "deferred graded vesting," which
in the Javits proposal means vesting of ten percent of benefits at the
conclusion of the sixth year of continuous service, with incremental
vesting of an additional ten percent of benefits each year until full
vesting occurs after fifteen years of service. The latter approach might
ameliorate the harsh results in many of the reported cases in which
none but the longest service personnel attained any benefit credit at all.
The proposals are consistent with the steadily accelerating trend
toward earlier vesting of benefits.209 A recent Pension Research
Council study of 1,047 plans (in 1966) having some vesting require-
ments revealed that 27.3 percent of the plans (with 47.3 percent of
the participants and 50.6 percent of the dollar value of invested bene-
fits) required ten years or less for full vesting. Plans requiring eleven
to twenty years of service were 41.9 percent of the total (with 34.1
percent of the participants and 37.1 percent of the dollar value of in-
vested benefits). The late-vesting funds, those requiring over twenty-
208. M. BZRNSTZIN, supra note 5, at 246-48.
209. Davis, supra note 16, at 11.
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one years of service, were 30.8 percent of the total number, but only
18.5 percent of the participants and 12.3 percent of the dollar value
of invested benefits. 210 The trend, particularly under the impetus of
collective bargaining, is unmistakably toward less stringent vesting
requirements. It should be noted, however, that total vesting after
10 years or even graded vesting from six to ten years would protect
only those who were fully vested and, to a limited extent, those who
were partially vested if there was a dislocation. Those not fully vested
would still lose out. Even those vested would have certain serious
problems. They would have no say as to who managed their money.
Furthermore, a man who is vested in less than a maximum pension
from his old job may move to a new job where he will not have
enough opportunity for future service to attain a maximum pension.
This result may give him a lower over-all pension than he had counted
on from the first job.
2. Funding
Typically a pension plan may fund twenty percent or more of a
plan's accrued benefit obligation by the end of the plan's fifth year of
operation; by the end of the tenth year the total will have reached
between forty and sixty-five percent. Viewed from the vantage-point
of employee benefit losses in plant shutdowns, sale and merger, these
funding patterns suggest strongly that unless past service credits are
transferred, workers could stand to lose eighty percent of their total
accrued benefits if their plan terminates in its fifth year.21 At ten
years the loss could range between thirty-five and sixty percent.2 12
The Yarborough bill required full funding by the end of the
twenty-fifth year, while the Javits proposal permits existing plans
forty years to amortize their unfunded liabilities, and thirty years
for new plans. With the long funding periods provided, neither pro-
posal solves the problem of the immature fund which is dissolved
prior to any meaningful degree of funding. Certainly, under the Javits
bill, which proposes partial vesting after six years' service, more
attention must be given funding arrangements during a plan's initial
years of operation. And benefit deprivation can occur without fund
insolvency. In the Kaiser-Frazer case (George v. Haber)213 it was
210. R. VAN DSUR4N, supra note 206, at 237.
211. Beier, Termination of Pension Plans: 11 Years Experience, MONTHLY LAB.
-tv., June 1967, at 30. Of the 4,259 terminated qualified plans (1955-65) upon which
the Article is based, 1,966 (46.2 percent) had been in existence 5 years or less at the
time of termination. They covered 65,000 employees, 28.9 percent of the 225,000
employees who participated in plans covered by the study.
212. See generally id.
213. 343 Mich. 218, 72 N.W.2d 121 (1955).
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noted that the fund of some $6,000,000 was far in excess of potential
liabilities, and yet the participants were denied a distribution of assets
or an equitable declaration of vesting.
Rigid funding standards are not essentially necessary in most
industry-wide plans. In single company plans they would protect the
plan from collapsing and would serve the same purpose as insurance.
But losses due to the insolvency of a plan are only a very small part
of the problem of denied benefits.
3. Insurance
The Javits Bill, as its author states, "reinsures against only one
contingency: termination of the employer's business before the un-
funded liabilities of the pension plan are funded. The premium is
geared to the amount of such unfunded liabilities, and cannot exceed
one percent of that amount." '14 The bill envisions a program similar
in nature to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and insures
benefits only up to specified amounts. An alternative legislative ap-
proach would be for the plans to purchase insurance to guarantee pay-
ment of vested benefits in the event of plan termination due to cessation
of operations by the employer or other adverse economic conditions. 15
Where loss of pension benefits is due to a single company trust
going bankrupt, the imposition of an insurance or, as some choose to
call it a "reinsurance" plan, would eliminate the problem. Such an
insurance scheme need not be imposed on industry-wide or multi-
employer plans since the protection is usually unnecessary due to the
very nature of these plans. An insurance program would be suitable
and worth the cost for single company plans since the expense of
premium would be justified by the protection afforded. A situation such
as the loss in Studebaker16 might be avoided. But plan insolvencies
precipitate only a minimal percent of benefit losses and while insurance
would solve a small part of the problem it does not even touch the
more frequent and serious areas where loss of pension is due not to
fund insolvency but to lack of eligibility for the pension benefit.
4. Portability
Vesting and funding of benefit credits are crucial to the individual's
realization of his retirement security expectations. However, porta-
bility has assumed critical importance in recent years. In many cases
of plant shutdown, termination and discontinuation, all non-vested
214. 115 CONG. Rtc. 5196 (daily ed. May 14, 1969).
215. F. POHLIG, Legislation of Benefits Security, 1968 TIxMBooK, supra note 1,
at 129, 131.
216. See notes 99-103 supra and accompanying text.
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benefit credits were deemed forfeit where, as in practically each case, the
plan was held not to have terminated. Had the employees the advantage
of a reciprocity agreement or some similar portability device, they
might have salvaged their accrued, albeit non-vested, benefit credits.
As portability is currently viewed it may be said that "[u]nion
pressures have been responsible for the adoption of many reciprocal
arrangements. This is particularly true in industries demonstrating
a need for extension of the pooled pension fund arrangement without
interfering with existing collective bargaining relationships and estab-
lished pension plans.121 7 The significant reciprocity agreements are
found primarily among plans of the same union in industries or areas
characterized by job shifts which, were it not for reciprocity, would
severely penalize the member-participants. "Most agreements cover
only a craft or occupational group in a specific industry, one region,
or metropolitan area.
218
Although reciprocity may be developing, it is a difficult area owing
to the wide diversity of funding practices, benefit levels, contribution
amounts, vesting requirements and collective bargaining agreements
which underlie negotiated plans. The Yarborough bill does not actually
reach the complex portability area, but proposes authorization of fur-
ther study. The Javits bill does not create specific obligatory machinery
to force portability. Rather, the bill specifically provides that:
It is declared to be the policy of the Congress that a system of
pension portability should be established by the Federal Govern-
ment to facilitate the voluntary transfer of credits between regis-
tered pension or profit-sharing-retirement plans having similar
benefit features and actuarial assumptions. Nothing in this title...
shall be construed to require participation in such portability
system by a plan as a condition of registration under this Act.21
This idea may derive from Professor Merton Bernstein's chapter en-
titled "Transferable Credits and Clearing House Devices."2 Informal
"portability" is encouraged, although not mandated under the Javits
bill, by the special and lenient funding arrangements permitted for
multi-employer plans. There is a degree of portability built into such
plans so long as the employee confines his employment experience to
contributing employers within the group. The minimal vesting re-
quirements set out in the Javits bill create a substitute for portability,
in that it is conceivable that an employee may change jobs several
times during the course of his career, attaining some degree of vested
217. Kolodrubetz, supra note 21, at 23.
218. Id. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
219. S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1969).
220. M. B4RNSTIIN, supra note 5, at 264-96.
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interest in several plans. When he retires at age sixty-five he is eligible
to receive his vested benefits under each plan, together with Social
Security payments. Under the clearing house proposals which have
been advanced in this country and in Canada2 1 the ultimate accrual
of multi-plan benefits may be capable of practical implementation.
Total portability of pension credits would materially solve the
problems discussed only if all employment had pension plans. When
the worker went to employment which did not have any pension plan
he would have no where to put his accrued past service credit. In
any event, mandatory portability is not included in current bills. The
type of portability proposed is in fact a form of government sanctioned
reciprocity and would not protect workers unless their trust subscribed
to such a concept. Total portability, presumably, is not included in
pending legislation because of the disadvantages attached to it and
the fact that it would engender considerable opposition.222 Moreover,
there are many reasons to resist total and mandatory portability and
little likelihood of such enactment into law in the near future.
5. Fiduciary Responsibility
A federal standard of fiduciary responsibility is mandated in sev-
eral pieces of proposed legislation. Even the most non-controversial
proposed bill of all - that prepared by the U.S. Department of Labor
and representing the present Administration's view - provides for a
"federal prudent man" rule. It provides that the "employee benefit
fund shall be deemed to be a trust and shall be held for the exclusive
purpose of 1) providing benefits to participants in the plan and their
beneficiaries and 2) defraying reasonable expenses of administering
the plan." The legislation also provides that civil actions "brought by
a participant or beneficiary may be brought in any court of competent
jurisdiction, State or Federal." '23 The federal standard of fiduciary
responsibility might be a higher one - particularly as it evolves -
than those presently prevailing in some of the fifty states, although
many states already have strict and comprehensive standards of
fiduciary liability.
It is important to note that a federal law of fiduciary responsibility
will cut two ways and also have scant significance in solving the
problems discussed here. On the one hand, it might induce better
trustee performance and thus minimize losses from malfeasance, and
221. Id. at 296.
222. See, e.g., Curtis, Actuarial Implications of Pending Pension Legislation,
PENSION & WELFAR4 Ntws, Apr. 1969, at 28.
223. See discussion of proposed Administration legislation in The Wall Streetjournal, Oct. 17, 1969, at 5, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1970, at 15, col. 1.
H.R. 16462 was introduced on March 16, 1970.
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negligence. But these occurrences are infrequent now. In many situa-
tions they are covered by the bonding which is already legally required;
and in other instances the institution of the proposed insurance for
funds would make up any losses. On the other hand, stricter fiduciary
responsibility would make a trustee even less likely to allocate funds
to a mass of members who left if the trust indenture did not specifically
allow it. It would likely enforce the trustee's determination to follow
to the letter all of the technicalities of law. As a result, trustees would
be extremely reluctant to adopt equitable solutions themselves and
litigation would actually be encouraged.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, in conclusion we can see that more precise and effective
safeguards must be afforded than those proposed under the new laws.
Adoption of our recommendations is urged both with respect to the
substantive treatment of loss of pension benefits and insofar as new
procedural methods will permit the aggrieved an appropriate forum
for hearing.
Specific provisions should be made in currently pending legisla-
tion to right wrongs which have occurred and will inevitably arise
again unless antidotes are taken. Since new legislation is pending and
some form of law is likely of enactment, now is the time to recom-
mend improvement for such legislation. This article's recommenda-
tions are not intended as all inclusive panaceas. The focus has been
on groups that are wronged. If groups of people lose coverage under
pension plans, then the remaining participants or the contributors are
unjustly enriched. And those deprived of their expected benefits are
unjustly punished. The test should be that if the defection from the
plan of the group is of a nature that would not have been normally
foreseeable in an actuarial survey, then the individuals should have
their benefit protected. If the losses are of the type usually included
in actuarial calculations based on individual actions and company
history, i.e., longevity, morbidity, discharge, lay-off, etc., then no
adjustment should be made.
If this criterion is followed, no persons are hurt and none unfairly
benefit. Thus, if huge groups separate from a plan and if the dollars
paid in for them follow them, there is no unfavorable effect on the
balance of the participants or employers remaining in the plan and
no actuarial reevaluation is required. Using this criterion, trustees can
find out from their actuary if calculations have been made for losses of
participants such as the particular one in question. There is no in-
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congruity in distinguishing between groups and individuals. The dif-
ference is qualitative as well as quantitative.
Once it is decided that the earned dollars contributed for a group
of individuals really belong to them, then the person hearing the
case can best determine how this should be done. For example, if
there was a decertification election and the members joined another
union, then the money proportionate to their membership in the old
plan should be partitioned off. It should either go to establish a new
plan for these workers, or be paid in a lump sum to the established
pension plan of the new union, so as to purchase maintenance of the
same past service credit which these people already had - leaving them
no better nor worse off than they were before; and not hurting par-
ticipants or employer contributors of the plan from which they exited.
The general principle is that the money follows the man. The
dollars would be transferred from one fund to another or a new fund
would be created or if these options were impossible, proportional
lump-sum distribution to the individuals would be made. Tax problems,
if any, resulting from this, could easily be handled with appropriate
Internal Revenue Service regulations. It might be necessary for the
Internal Revenue Service to rule that such a distribution, even if
the employee did not terminate his employment, and would not, under
current regulation, be eligible for capital gains treatment, would still
be taxed in this more favorable way because of the circumstances.
It certainly is fairer that an employee who is deprived of an expected
pension, not be doubly penalized by having his lump-sum payment
taxed to him as ordinary income. This would occur, if he were under
65, as would generally be the case, while he was still in a relatively
high bracket and could conceivably eat up a third or a half of the
total monies disbursed. 224
Laws are fashioned to prevent chaos and to right wrongs. Here
we have compelling examples of injustices which could, and actually
do occur under the present private pension system. There are per-
suasive reasons for endeavoring to right these wrongs. Repeated in-
stances of wrongdoing, unfair deprivation or unjust enrichment may
result in a demand for abolition of the entire private pension system.
Many do not want this to happen. 225 From a moral and social view-
point to deprive persons who are without fault of the fruits of their
labor is wrong. A small premium paid to obviate injustice is insur-
ance against social disorder and chaos. Practically speaking, adoption
of the proposals advocated here will, in the long run, avoid litigation
224. See INT. Rgv. CODE of 1964, §§ 1201-50 (capital gains); §§ 1301-05 (in-
come averaging).
225. See Levin, supra note 25, at 22.
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and save money for qualified pensioners and contributors. Pension
and welfare funds are increasing at an accelerating rate. The sums
invested burgeon, the level of benefits escalate and the number of per-
sons multiplies. The case law to date has not solved the problems
which have arisen. The narrow application of old principles of con-
tract or trust law simply cannot be applied with equitable results
to employee benefit trusts.
The law can be used as a precision instrument to achieve the ends
suggested. Enactment of laws suggested herein, either independently,
or as amendments or additions to the presently proposed pension and
welfare regulatory bill, will expedite justice.
67
Clark: The Court and Its Critics
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
